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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND  
THE DOMINO EFFECT 
LAURA T. KESSLER* 
ABSTRACT 
 Employment discrimination is a multidimensional problem. In many instances, some 
combination of employer bias, the organization of work, and employees’ responses to these 
conditions, leads to worker inequality. Title VII does not sufficiently account for these 
dynamics in two significant respects. First, Title VII’s major proof structures divide 
employment discrimination into discrete categories, for example, disparate treatment, 
disparate impact, and sexual harassment. This compartmentalization does not account for 
the fact that protected employees often concurrently experience more than one form of 
discriminatory exclusion. The various types of exclusion often add up to significant 
inequalities, even though seemingly insignificant when considered in isolation. Second, Title 
VII’s major theories of liability are premised on the assumption that employee 
characteristics, such as motivation and work performance, are independent of 
discrimination. Yet common sense and a significant body of social science research suggest 
that discrimination has significant effects on employees’ work-related decisions and 
behaviors, such as the decision to apply for a job or promotion, as well as worker motivation 
and job performance. Applying the insights of sociology and social psychology, this Article 
examines the fundamental flaws of these assumptions that lie at the heart of Title VII. Race, 
sex, and other forms of group-based worker inequality result from a dynamic interaction 
among biased evaluations and decisions, structural features of the workplace, and 
employees’ responses to these forms of discrimination. I label these workplace dynamics the 
“domino effect.” Like an elaborately arranged set of falling dominoes, worker inequality 
often results from a series of discriminatory conditions or triggers that combine and interact 
in ways that, over time, may lead to large differences in employee status and pay due to 
their cumulative and mutually reinforcing nature. I propose and evaluate a set of legal 
interventions that would help courts and policymakers better address the domino-like 
dynamics that result in inequality for workers protected by Title VII. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Who is responsible for gender, race, and other stubborn patterns 
of worker inequality?1 This question lies at the heart of all of the 
theories of liability under Title VII.2 From disparate treatment to 
sexual harassment, from affirmative action to disparate impact, the 
ultimate question is whether worker inequality is due to some 
unlawful action by employers, for which employers must be held 
accountable, or due to factors outside employers’ responsibility or 
control. When an employer calls Greg Baker for a job interview 
rather than Lakisha Jones, is it because Greg’s resume suggests he is 
                                                                                                                            
 1. By “inequality,” I refer to institutionalized rather than individual inequality. All 
workers are inevitably “unequal” relative to their peers as a function of their qualifications, 
skills, seniority, or even chance events or opportunities. However, I use worker inequality 
here and throughout this Article to mean structured inequality between categories of 
workers on the basis of their identities such as race, sex, sexuality, national origin, reli-
gion, and disability that are systematically created, reproduced, and legitimated by sets of 
ideas. See CHARLES E. HURST, SOCIAL INEQUALITY: FORMS, CAUSES, AND CONSEQUENCES 3 
(8th ed. 2012) (adopting a similar definition of inequality). 
 2. This Article concerns itself primarily with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012), which prohibits discrimination in employment on 
the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, and religion. Although not an exclusive remedy 
for workplace-discrimination, Title VII is the broadest-ranging federal employment nondis-
crimination law. For the most part, this Article’s analysis should also apply to other federal 
nondiscrimination laws, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act “regarded” as provi-
sion, see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C), as well as state employment nondiscrimination laws. 




better qualified or because Lakisha’s name is African-American-
sounding?3 When a casino fires a female bartender after twenty years 
of service for refusing to wear make-up in compliance with its new 
grooming policy, is her termination illegal sex discrimination or a 
legally permissible decision based on male customer preference to 
have their drinks served by feminine women with sex appeal?4 
Similarly, if a retailer of teen apparel decides to brand its “Authentic 
American Clothing”5 around the concept of racial and other types of 
exclusion, is it responsible when it routinely steers Hispanics, 
Asians, and African Americans to stockroom jobs,6 or is this a 
legitimate profit-related practice?7 When an ambitious female junior 
                                                                                                                            
 3. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Em-
ployable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 
AM. ECON. REV. 991, 991-93 (2004) (studying race in the labor market and finding that 
identical resumes with white-sounding names receive fifty percent more callbacks for in-
terviews than resumes with black-sounding names and that the racial gap is uniform 
across occupation, industry, and employer size); Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. 
Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being “Regarded as” Black, and Why Title VII Should 
Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal Are White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1284 (discussing 
discrimination on the basis of having an African-American-sounding name). 
 4. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(en banc). Anne McGinley has written extensively about dress codes that sexualize women. 
See, e.g., Anne C. McGinley, Babes and Beefcake: Exclusive Hiring Arrangements and Sexy 
Dress Codes, 14 DUKE J. GENDER, L. & POL’Y 257, 259-60 (2007). 
 5. See ABERCROMBIE & FITCH, https://www.abercrombie.com/shop/us (last visited 
June 5, 2017). 
 6. See Steven Greenhouse, Clothing Chain Accused of Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 17, 2003, at A1. Abercrombie & Fitch ultimately settled a class-action lawsuit based 
on these facts for $40 million in 2004 and agreed to alter its image by adding more blacks, 
Hispanics, and Asians to its marketing materials. See Steven Greenhouse, Abercrombie & 
Fitch Bias Case Is Settled, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2004, at A4. However, the company ran 
into trouble again in 2008 when it refused to hire Samantha Elauf, a seventeen-year-old 
Muslim woman, because she wore a headscarf, which violated the clothing retailer’s “Look 
Policy.” See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2031 (2015). The 
EEOC sued on her behalf, and the Supreme Court ultimately decided 8-1 in the plaintiff’s 
favor. Id. at 2034.  
 7. Abercrombie & Fitch explicitly built its reputation around the concept of discrimi-
nation and exclusion. As its CEO Mike Jeffries explained in a 2006 Salon interview: 
In every school there are the cool and popular kids, and then there are the not-
so-cool kids . . . . Candidly, we go after the cool kids. We go after the attractive 
all-American kid with a great attitude and a lot of friends. A lot of people don’t 
belong [in our clothes], and they can’t belong. Are we exclusionary? Absolutely. 
Those companies that are in trouble are trying to target everybody: young, old, 
fat, skinny. 
See Benoit Denizet-Lewis, The Man Behind Abercrombie & Fitch, SALON (Jan. 24, 2006, 10:16 
AM) (alteration in original), http://www.salon.com/2006/01/24/jeffries/ [http://perma.cc/85S9-
XJUR]. Its stores sold t-shirts with sexist and racist messages such as “Who Needs a Brain 
When You Have These?” and “Do I Make You Look Fat?” (women’s shirts) and “Wong Brothers 
Laundry Service — Two Wongs Can Make It White.” Id. When asked about the controversial 
shirts, Jeffries responded, “I really don’t care what anyone other than our target customer 
thinks.” Id. The company refused to carry larger women’s sizes. See Ashley Lutz,  
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investing partner in a Silicon Valley venture capital firm is not 
promoted, despite her investment successes, is it because she is a 
woman or because she is perceived as being ungrateful and difficult, 
and being a likeable “team player” is more important at the firm?8 At 
Wal-Mart, the most profitable retailer in the United States and the 
largest private employer in the world, women make up only thirty-
three percent of management employees despite filling seventy 
percent of the retailer’s national sales workforce.9 Women are also 
paid less than men in every region.10 Is this because gender bias 
suffuses Wal-Mart’s culture? Or can these patterns be explained by a 
lack of women who are qualified and interested in management 
positions at Wal-Mart11 and “left to their own devices most managers 
in any corporation—and surely most managers in a corporation that 
forbids sex discrimination—would select sex-neutral, performance-
based criteria.”12 If an upscale restaurant has a reputation for not 
hiring female food servers, and this reputation discourages qualified 
women from applying for server positions, is this employment 
discrimination or the result of the women’s personal choices?13 If a 
fire department uses a weightlifting test as its primary physical 
selection procedure, is the lack of women firefighters due to the fire 
department’s hiring criteria or because the average man is stronger 
than the average woman?14 What if agility, balance, endurance, 
                                                                                                                            
Abercrombie & Fitch Refuses to Make Clothes for Large Women (May 23, 2013,  
10:36 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/abercrombie-wants-thin-customers-2013-5 
[https://perma.cc/N9Q7-UR87]. It also reportedly incinerated faulty clothing rather than do-
nate it to charity and derided poor people. See Ella Alexander, Would You Rather Go Naked 
Than Wear Abercrombie?, VOGUE (May 16, 2013), http://www.vogue.co.uk/article/abercrombie-
fitch-homeless-campaign-launched-by-greg-karber [https://perma.cc/CW6R-PVXR] (“Abercrom-
bie & Fitch doesn’t want to create the image that just anybody, poor people, can wear their 
clothing . . . . Only people of a certain stature are able to purchase and wear the company 
name.”). Successful lawsuits, public outcry, and the resulting market tumble eventually led to a 
total makeover of the company’s brand. See Elizabeth Holmes, Abercrombie & Fitch Tries on a 
New Attitude: Friendly, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/abercrombie-
fitch-tries-on-a-new-attitude-friendly-1476291100 (discussing the company’s 2013 anti-bullying 
campaign and quoting a top executive as stating “[w]e are a positive, inclusive brand, with a nice 
sensibility, very different from what they encountered in the past”). 
 8. See Brief for Respondent at 3, Pao v. Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers LLC, (No. 
CGC-12-520719), 2012 WL 6929868, at *3-4; see also Terry Collins, Ellen Pao Trial Ends 
on Plea for Gender Equality in the Tech Industry, CNET (Mar. 25, 2015, 4:25 PM), 
http://www.cnet.com/news/ellen-pao-trial-ends-on-plea-for-gender-equality-in-the-tech-
industry/ [https://perma.cc/PJM4-W3S8]. 
 9. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 370 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 356 (Scalia, J., majority opinion); see also EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
839 F.2d 302, 330 (7th Cir. 1988) (adopting a similar “lack of interest” theory of women’s 
systemic inequality). 
 12. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 355. 
 13. See EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1268 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 14. See Delia Roberts et al., Current Considerations Related to Physiological Differ-
ences Between the Sexes and Physical Employment Standards, 41 APPL. PHYSIOL. NUTR. 
 




aerobic capacity, speed, and teamwork are as important to successful 
firefighter performance as upper-body strength?15 Should Title VII 
make a fire department liable for sex discrimination if it emphasizes 
upper-body strength over these other important qualities in its 
selection criteria? If a female postal service driver becomes pregnant 
and her doctor advises her not to lift more than twenty pounds, her 
employer forces her on unpaid leave, and she loses her medical 
insurance, is this sex discrimination or simply the employee’s 
unfortunate problem, since she temporarily cannot meet the job’s 
requirements?16 If an African-American dining services employee at a 
university is the subject of ongoing racial harassment by a white 
coworker, is the university vicariously liable for the harassment?17 
Or, rather, is this behavior an unauthorized act of the white 
employee for which the university is presumptively not responsible 
unless the victim complains and the university negligently fails to 
respond?18 What if, fearing for her job, the victim does not complain 
at all,19 or she complains, but to the wrong person (for example, to a 
mid-level supervisor or a union representative who does not have the 
authority to discipline or fire the harasser)? Should this create 
liability or is the matter, again, not the employer’s responsibility?20 
                                                                                                                            
METAB. S108, S110 (2016) (“Women have approximately 70%-75% of the lower body 
strength and 40%–60% of the upper body strength than that of men . . . .”). 
 15. See Ruth Colker, Rank-Order Physical Abilities Selection Devices for Traditionally 
Male Occupations as Gender-Based Employment Discrimination, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
761, 793-97 (1986). 
 16. See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1344 (2015); see also Con-
sent Decree, United States v. Davie, No. 15-cv-60395 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/file/344841/download [https://perma.cc/K7DX-GYQ3] (resolving 
allegations of pregnancy discrimination arising from denial of light duty to a pregnant 
firefighter despite her medical and physical needs while routinely granting other non-
pregnant firefighters’ requests for light duty for non-work-related injuries). 
 17. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 423 (2013). 
 18. In these circumstances, the university is not vicariously liable, according to a ma-
jority of the Supreme Court, because the white coworker did not have power to take tangi-
ble employment action against the African-American plaintiff, that is, to hire or fire her. 
Id. For criticisms of the majority’s narrow, formalistic definition of vicarious liability, see 
Martha Chamallas, Two Very Different Stories: Vicarious Liability Under Tort and Title 
VII Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315 (2014); Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights 
Without Remedies: Vicarious Liability Under Title VII, Section 1983 and Title IX, 7 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 755, 772 (1999); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exas-
perating: Title VII Liability of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their Su-
pervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 66, 89 (1995). 
 19. See, e.g., McKinnish v. Brennan, 630 F. App’x 177, 184 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding 
that an employer was not liable for sexual harassment, because the plaintiff did not report 
her supervisor’s explicit texts and her subjective fear of retaliation did not excuse her fail-
ure to report). 
 20. See, e.g., Chaloult v. Interstate Brands Corp., 540 F.3d 64, 75-76 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(holding that the plaintiff must lose her harassment claim even though a supervisor knew 
about the harassment, because she should have reported it to a higher-level supervisor). 
6  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:3  
 
 Each of these examples is drawn from a recent, real-world 
employment discrimination case. As they demonstrate, every 
instance of alleged employment discrimination can be conceptualized 
as a choice between an illegal “inside” cause of worker inequality and 
a legal “outside” cause of worker inequality. Economists and other 
social scientists describe this divide in terms of “demand side” and 
“supply side” explanations of worker inequality.21 Broadly, demand 
side explanations of worker inequality focus on discrimination 
occurring inside workplaces such as intentional discrimination, 
unconscious biases, and neutral policies and practices that 
systematically disadvantage workers protected by employment 
discrimination statutes.22 Supply side theories, in contrast, attribute 
inequality to workers’ personal preferences, qualifications, and 
performance.23 Supply side factors include, for example, the absence 
of requisite job skills; differences in education, training, or 
motivation; culture and socialization; and choices that employees 
make in light of family obligations and other personal circumstances. 
 The major theories of employer liability under Title VII sharply 
differentiate between demand side and supply side causes of worker 
inequality. For example, Title VII disparate treatment claims are 
premised on the assumption that an adverse employment action is 
either because of an employer’s illegal consideration of protected 
characteristics (such as race, sex, or national origin) or for a 
“legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.”24 Within this analytical 
framework, there is no room to consider if discrimination may have 
negatively impacted the “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” basis for an 
employer’s decision, such as an employee’s job performance.25 That is, 
by its very definition, the legal concept of disparate treatment ignores 
the social structure in which prejudice, bias, and discrimination 
operate.  
                                                                                                                            
 21. See Barbara Reskin, Sex Segregation in the Workplace, 19 ANN. REV. SOC. 241, 248 
(1993) (discussing the distinction between supply side and demand side drivers of worker 
inequality). 
 22. See, e.g., id. (sex segregation). 
 23. See, e.g., NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING 30-39, 178-79, 
219 (1978) (gender socialization); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE 
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 269-73 (1992) (sex roles and human capital); 
DAN SUBOTNIK, TOXIC DIVERSITY: RACE, GENDER, AND LAW TALK IN AMERICA 146-64 (2005) 
(women’s role as family caregivers, lack of mobility, and relational, non-competitive 
nature); Gary S. Becker, Human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor, 3 J. 
LAB. ECON. S33, S55 (1985) (human capital); Daniel Bell, On Meritocracy and Equality, 29 
PUB. INT. 29, 37 (1972) (individual talent and achievement).  
 24. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 25. Indeed, although the burden is light, showing “satisfactory job performance” is 
commonly incorporated as an element in the prima facie case for plaintiffs alleging dispar-
ate treatment in cases involving demotion, promotion, or termination. See, e.g., Webb v. 
Level 3 Commc’ns, LLC, 167 F. App’x 725, 728 (10th Cir. 2006). 




 To be sure, some aspects of Title VII doctrine acknowledge that 
demand side and supply side explanations for worker inequality over-
lap and are difficult to neatly separate from one another. For exam-
ple, the mixed-motive proof structure suggests that both demand side 
factors (i.e., discriminatory considerations of protected characteris-
tics) and supply side factors (i.e., legal considerations of employee 
qualifications or performance) may concurrently play a role in an 
employment decision, with the ultimate inquiry focusing on which 
factor predominated the decision.26 Similarly, Title VII’s disparate 
impact theory of liability recognizes that facially neutral employer 
policies or practices may so systematically and unjustifiably stack the 
deck against protected employees that liability for discrimination 
should attach. As such, the disparate impact theory recognizes that 
structural aspects of the workplace negatively affect individual work-
ers.27 And the hostile work environment theory of liability defines un-
lawful discrimination to include a work environment severely and per-
vasively infected with discriminatory, offensive conduct, such as 
threats, intimidation, and ridicule, even in the absence of any formal 
personnel action, because of the exclusionary effects of such treatment.  
 It is easy to point to these examples and conclude that Title VII is 
at least reasonably sensitive to the interplay between demand side 
and supply side drivers of worker inequality. However, a close study 
of Title VII doctrine reveals a decidedly less positive picture. Courts 
routinely assume a sharp distinction between demand side and sup-
ply side explanations of worker inequality when analyzing and apply-
ing Title VII. For example, although the mixed-motive theory recog-
nizes that both legal and illegal considerations may factor into an 
employment decision, the mixed-motive theory still assumes the ab-
sence of any causal relationship between the legal considerations 
(e.g., employee motivation, performance, qualifications) and illegal 
considerations (e.g., bias on the basis of protected characteristics).28 
When considering systemic disparate treatment and disparate im-
pact claims, courts often attribute stark racial and gender disparities 
in pay and workforce composition to external causes, such as the ab-
sence of diversity in the applicant pool,29 with little regard for the 
powerful role of employers in influencing the labor markets in which 
                                                                                                                            
 26. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2012); Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1989); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 93-94 (2003). 
 27. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 642, 652-62 (2001) (providing a classic account of how Title VII, particularly disparate 
impact liability, works as an accommodation mandate when it invalidates facially neutral 
rules that disproportionately burden particular groups of employees). 
 28. See infra Section III.B.1. 
 29. See infra Section III.B.2. 
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they operate.30 Finally, the Supreme Court has carved out a broad 
affirmative defense to employer liability for sexual harassment that, 
in practical effect, requires victims of harassment to report in virtual-
ly all circumstances or risk losing their claims.31 This doctrine ne-
glects the power dynamics and economic vulnerabilities that lead vic-
tims not to report harassment.32 By defining discrimination and em-
ployee behavior as mutually exclusive phenomena, sexual harass-
ment law, like Title VII’s other theories of liability, ignores the social 
patterns of discrimination that shape the employees subject to them. 
 Mirroring the bifurcated approach in Title VII doctrine, much so-
cial science research and public discourse on employment discrimina-
tion defines and constructs the issue as a question of whether de-
mand side or supply side phenomena are responsible for race, gender, 
and other identity-based patterns of worker inequality, with little 
attention to the causal interrelationships between demand side and 
supply side factors. Consider, for example, the recent public debate 
between Facebook CEO Sheryl Sandberg and former Princeton Pro-
fessor Anne-Marie Slaughter about why women cannot rise to the top 
professionally. In her book, Lean In,33 Sandberg emphasizes the ways 
that women lower expectations for themselves in the workplace; she 
                                                                                                                            
 30. Moreover, class-action disparate treatment and disparate impact cases represent 
only a small portion of the employment discrimination cases filed in any event. See Kevin 
M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal 
Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 112 (2009); John J. Donohue & 
Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. 
L. REV. 983, 998 (1991). 
 31. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 430-31 (2013). Vance held that an 
employer can be vicariously liable for an employee’s unlawful harassment only when the 
employer has empowered that employee to effect a “significant change in employment sta-
tus of the victim, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly 
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Id. The 
practical result is that employees can now only win a harassment case involving all but the 
most senior managers by proving negligence. Id. at 2452, 2448-52. This typically requires 
the victim to make a formal complaint, ideally immediately; provide all details; agree to 
cooperate in any investigation; and refrain from asking that the harasser not be disci-
plined. See L. Camille Hébert, Why Don’t “Reasonable Women” Complain About Sexual 
Harassment? 82 IND. L.J. 711, 733 (2007). 
 32. See Theresa M. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge: The Implications of 
Social Science Research on Imputing Liability to Employers for Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. 
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273, 312-25 (2001) (discussing studies on the reasons that the vast 
majority of harassment victims do not report, including fears that they will lose their jobs, 
that they will not be believed, and that it will not help their situations); Hébert, supra note 
31, at 724-42 (identifying discomfort and embarrassment; fear of being labeled as a trou-
blemaker; not being believed; threats of termination; fear of retaliation; and concerns about 
physical safety, among other reasons, for not reporting sexual harassment); Tanya Katerí 
Hernández, A Critical Race Feminism Empirical Research Project: Sexual Harassment & 
the Internal Complaints Black Box, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1244-45 (2006) (discussing 
both that harassers disproportionately target women of color because of their heightened 
vulnerability in the workforce and that women of color are less likely to report sexual har-
assment than are white women). 
 33. See SHERYL SANDBERG, LEAN IN: WOMEN, WORK, AND THE WILL TO LEAD (2013). 




urges women to strive for leadership roles despite discriminatory 
challenges. Her analysis emphasizes individual women’s responsibil-
ity for overcoming discrimination.34 In contrast, Anne-Marie Slaugh-
ter’s Atlantic Monthly article35 and subsequent book on balancing 
work and family36 focus on governmental policies and structural fea-
tures of workplaces that result in inequality for family caregivers 
(still primarily women in our society).37 Although the differences in 
Sandberg’s and Slaughter’s positions are perhaps more a matter of 
emphasis or degree, which in turn influences what each commentator 
sees as the appropriate remedy for gender-based economic inequali-
ty,38 the media has held up these two prominent influential women as 
opposing voices.39 There is a similar “either/or” framing in research 
and public discourse on the gender pay gap, with proponents of wage 
equity attributing the wage gap to discrimination and wage-gap de-
niers emphasizing supply side human capital factors, such as educa-
tion, experience, and individual worker “choices.”40 
 As these examples demonstrate, Title VII’s major legal doctrines, 
as well as public debates about employment discrimination, regard 
the three prevailing explanations of worker inequality—individual 
employee choices and characteristics, biased decisionmaking, and 
structural features of the workplace—as distinct and independent 
phenomena. The result is that our country’s most important federal 
employment discrimination law is oftentimes unable to redress em-
ployment discrimination as it actually manifests inside workplaces. 
Further, by failing to recognize the dynamic, interactive processes 
generating worker inequality, legal and political discourses on dis-
crimination mask the pervasive and powerful role of institutions in 
creating inequality. 
                                                                                                                            
 34. Id. at 142-58. 
 35. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why Women Still Can’t Have It All, ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY, July/Aug. 2012. 
 36. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: WOMEN MEN WORK FAMILY 
(2015). 
 37. Id. at 119-25. 
 38. For Sandberg, the solution is women’s ambition, confidence, and working harder; 
for Slaughter, it is changing the way that companies and government benefits work. Com-
pare SANDBERG, supra note 33, at 160-72, with SLAUGHTER, supra note 36, at 207-08. 
 39. See, e.g., Jodi Kantor, A Titan’s How-To on Breaking the Glass Ceiling, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/22/us/sheryl-sandberg-lean-in-author-
hopes-to-spur-movement.html; Patricia Sellers, Slaughter v. Sandberg: Can Women Have 
It All?, FORTUNE (June 25, 2012), http://fortune.com/2012/06/25/slaughter-vs-sandberg-can-
women-have-it-all/ [https://perma.cc/MB79-SX3W]. 
 40. See Rachel Greszler & James Sherk, Equal Pay for Equal Work: Examining the 
Gender Gap, HERITAGE FOUND. (May 22, 2014), https://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/ 
2014/pdf/IB4227.pdf (“Aggregate differences in pay reflect different choices made by indi-
vidual men and women.”). 
10  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:3  
 
 Many legal scholars have addressed the stubborn nature of dis-
crimination and the often complex and nuanced ways that it mani-
fests in the workplace. For example, many have discussed the unin-
tentional and unconscious nature of much discrimination, emphasiz-
ing the mismatch between this reality and disparate treatment law.41 
Others have examined the organizational context of work as a driver 
of inequality, focusing, for example, on how organizational practices, 
such as decentralized, subjective decisionmaking, the creation of non-
diverse work groups, and other features of organizational design and 
culture may influence the occurrence of discrimination.42 Still other 
scholars have documented how employees may respond to discrimi-
nation with strategies aimed at dispelling stereotypes that may at-
tach to their identities.43 Taken together, this substantial body of 
scholarship has led to considerable advances in our understandings 
of the dynamics of discrimination in the modern workplace. However, 
few scholars have sought to comprehensively theorize the interrela-
tionships among all three drivers of inequality: bias, structure, and 
employee responses to these phenomena. 
 In this Article, I try to juggle all three balls at once, so to speak, 
that is, to re-theorize Title VII doctrine to account for the interplay 
between organizational structures and discriminatory bias, on the 
one hand, while also considering how employees commonly respond 
to these demand side forms of discriminatory exclusion. This analysis 
reveals that worker inequality is often the result of the interplay 
between supply side and demand side processes. That is, in a broader 
respect than has generally been appreciated, there is a dynamic 
relationship among individual employee characteristics and 
preferences, biased decisionmaking, and structural barriers to 
                                                                                                                            
 41. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005); Linda 
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimi-
nation and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995). 
 42. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a 
Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 104-08, 
145-48 (2015) (documenting how discriminatory bias is perpetuated by the structures, 
practices, and dynamics of workplace organizations and groups); Tristin K. Green, Work 
Culture and Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 623, 650 (2005) (explaining how organization-
al choices can both facilitate and constrain the development of discriminatory work cul-
tures) [hereinafter Green, Work Culture]; Michael Selmi, Statistical Inequality and Inten-
tional (Not Implicit) Discrimination, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 215-20 (2016) (discuss-
ing the “extensive literature” demonstrating that implicit bias can be controlled through 
institutional interventions); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: 
A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 459-61 (2001) (describing “second genera-
tion” forms of bias as those that result from patterns of interaction, informal norms, net-
working, mentoring, and evaluation that produce differential access and opportunity). 
 43. See DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE? RETHINKING RACE IN 
POST-RACIAL AMERICA (2003); KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR 
CIVIL RIGHTS passim (2006).  




worker equality. For example, individuals’ career aspirations and job 
performance are shaped by both biased employment decisions and 
the organization of work. Similarly, organizational arrangements can 
serve to exacerbate or dampen discriminatory bias. Biased 
decisionmaking and structural impediments to equality occur 
simultaneously and combine and interact in dynamic ways that are 
internalized by individual employees, affecting their “choices” and 
work performance.44 In this view, discrimination is not an act or set 
of acts (as contemplated by disparate treatment and systemic 
disparate treatment) or a neutral policy with discriminatory effects 
(as contemplated by disparate impact). Rather, discrimination is 
more like a chain reaction involving individual worker behavior, 
biased decisions, and the organization of work that, through a 
process of positive feedback, produces and amplifies inequality. I 
refer to this process as the “domino effect.” 
 In its most literal sense, the domino effect refers to the physics of 
a row of toppling dominos.45 However, the concept has come to be 
used in a variety of contexts either literally, to refer to an observed 
series of physical collisions, or metaphorically, to describe causal 
linkages within systems such as computer networks,46 global 
finance,47 or politics.48 The metaphorical meanings of the term have 
varied widely; at the most basic level, the idea denotes that a small 
event may have unanticipated, far removed effects.49 A broader 
                                                                                                                            
 44. Although beyond the scope of this project, the social supports available to individ-
uals, as well as gendered dynamics of families, also have significant impacts on an individ-
ual’s labor market position. See Laura T. Kessler, Keeping Discrimination Theory Front and 
Center in the Discourse Over Work and Family Conflict, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 313, 322-24 (2007). 
 45. See D.E. Shaw, Mechanics of a Chain of Dominoes, 46 AM. J. PHYSICS 640 (1978). 
 46. See Zhongqiang Chen et al., Malware Characteristics and Threats on the Internet 
Ecosystem, 85 J. SYSTEMS & SOFTWARE 1650, 1659 (2012); Cassandra M. Kirsch, Science 
Fiction No More: Cyber Warfare and the United States, 40 DENV. J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y 620, 
645-46 (2012). 
 47. See THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT 301 (2011); Hans Degryse et al., Domino Effects from Cross-Border Exposures, in 
FINANCIAL CONTAGION: THE VIRAL THREAT TO THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 311-19 (Robert W. 
Kolb ed., 2011). 
 48. For example, after World War II, the idea of the “domino theory” emerged to ex-
press the idea that the conversion of a free, noncommunist nation into a communist state 
would trigger a chain reaction in neighboring countries. See DUNCAN TOWNSON, A 
DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY HISTORY 110 (1999). The domino theory became the basis 
for U.S. foreign policy in the Vietnam War and has been used to describe the fall of com-
munist regimes in Eastern Europe after 1989. Id. For a fuller treatment of the domino 
theory, see FRANK NINKOVICH, MODERNITY AND POWER: A HISTORY OF THE DOMINO 
THEORY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994). 
 49. This conception of the domino effect is similar to “the butterfly effect,” used to 
describe the phenomenon, originating in chaos theory, whereby a minute localized change 
in a complex system can have unpredictable, large effects elsewhere. See Edward N. Lorenz, 
Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow, 20 J. ATMOSPHERIC SCI. 130 (1936); Edward N. Lorenz, Pro-
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conception, which I employ in this Article, is that a seemingly small 
and insignificant incident can mushroom into a much larger, 
comprehensive problem. As I will argue, in the employment context, 
relatively small and insignificant discriminatory acts, policies, or work 
structures oftentimes initiate a chain reaction resulting in substantial 
and materially adverse forms of worker inequality, such as unequal 
pay and status. In addition to highlighting this process, which has 
been underexplored in legal scholarship, a key contribution of this 
Article is to examine how employees’ responses to discrimination are 
important to understanding the production of inequality. 
 It is important to note at the outset that I do not claim to 
definitively describe or predict workplace domino effects with 
certainty. Although social scientists have an ever-deepening 
understanding of the processes of stereotyping, prejudice, and 
discrimination,50 they have not arrived at any definitive theory. The 
problem of hierarchy and inequality in the workplace is multifaceted. 
Moreover, the precise character and manifestations of the domino 
effect are likely to differ across occupational and organizational 
contexts. Still, as I develop more fully below, social science research 
employing a wide range of methodologies in a wide range of work 
settings over a long period of time has consistently and reliably 
identified institutional and social processes by which inequality is 
created and maintained by organizations. This extensive body of 
research demonstrates that demand side and supply side drivers of 
worker inequality are not independent of one another. My objective is 
to begin a conversation. How might Title VII’s major theories of 
liability be modified, and what might a larger social policy agenda 
look like, were we to reject the following two flawed premises of Title 
VII: First, that inequality is a result either of the characteristics and 
preferences of individual workers or biased decisionmaking and 
organizational-level systems of stratification; and second, that there 
is no causal relationship among these phenomena?  
 An immense reform agenda emerges when we consider the 
implications of the domino effect for Title VII. For example, the 
assumed independence of an employee’s work performance from 
discriminatory employer actions in disparate treatment law becomes 
incoherent once we account for the domino effect. This Article 
                                                                                                                            
fessor of Meteorology, Predictability; Does the Flap of a Butterfly’s Wings in Brazil Set Off a 
Tornado in Texas?, Address at the American Association for the Advancement of Science, 
139th Meeting (Dec. 20, 1972), http://eaps4.mit.edu/research/Lorenz/Butterfly_1972.pdf. 
 50. Stereotypes are overgeneralized beliefs about individuals based on their group 
membership. Prejudice has a more affective or emotional component and is defined as bi-
ased attitudes. Discrimination is a behavioral response to perceived difference (i.e., unfair 
treatment). See Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in 2 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357 (Daniel.T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998). 




represents an effort to provide the initial empirical and theoretical 
groundwork for the larger project. As a concrete starting point, this 
Article focuses on two related policy contexts: sex-based employment 
discrimination and worker inequality arising from work and family 
conflict. These are especially fruitful domains of legal concern to 
examine the workplace domino effect.  
 Lack of paid family leave, inflexible and unpredictable work 
schedules, insufficient paid sick leave, the absence of accommodation 
for the physical limitations of normal pregnancy,51 and long work 
hours are common features of American workplaces that make it 
difficult for employees who become pregnant or have significant 
family responsibilities to perform as ideal workers.52 At the same 
time, pregnancy and family care responsibilities can make an 
employee’s sex and gender more salient in the workplace, triggering 
animus or bias by coworkers and managers. Once either or both of 
these processes are set in motion, a chain reaction often ensues. In 
many instances, what may have begun as inconsequential, isolated, 
or at least surmountable differences in employee availability or 
energy become the justification for differential treatment, whether it 
be differences in mentoring, training, and evaluation, for example, or 
more serious consequences, such as failure to promote or even the 
decision to terminate an employee. That is, structural barriers, bias, 
and employee responses to discrimination often combine and 
reinforce one another so as to produce substantial worker inequality.  
 Because these discriminatory dynamics are especially acute in the 
context of work and family conflict, this is a fruitful area of 
employment discrimination law to illustrate the operation of the 
domino effect. Specifically, I use this particularized form of gender 
discrimination as an example to illustrate how discrimination 
commonly plays out inside work organizations, the effects it has on 
individuals, and how it might be challenged. However, my extended 
focus on gender discrimination and work and family conflict is not 
                                                                                                                            
 51. There is guarded optimism that the Supreme Court’s decision in Young v. United 
Parcel Service, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015), may result in more pregnant workers receiving 
needed accommodations for common pregnancy-related physical limitations. However, the 
evidentiary burden is still quite high. See discussion infra note 80. There is no right under 
federal law to receive accommodations for normal pregnancy absent proof of disparate 
treatment. See Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
961, 964 (2013). For an illuminating history of the struggles for “meaningful, rather than 
formal, reproductive choice” leading to the passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 
see Mary Ziegler, Choice at Work: Young v. United Parcel Service, Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion, and Reproductive Liberty, 93 DENV. L. REV. 219, 274 (2015). 
 52. Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Wom-
en’s Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 371 passim (2001). 
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meant to suggest that the domino effect is limited to this form of 
discriminatory exclusion. For this reason, many of the empirical 
studies and cases I discuss address race and other types of 
discrimination, and this Article’s analysis should be useful to 
scholars and advocates working to remedy discrimination across 
identities and contexts. Its contributions operate on three levels: 
doctrine, theory, and methodology. 
 First, at its most basic level, this Article aims to assist plaintiffs’ 
lawyers by distilling complicated processes of discrimination into a 
simple, familiar, concept that can be used to frame Title VII 
litigation. Most people—including judges and jurors—have at some 
point in their lives witnessed the spectacle of dominos toppling in a 
cascade. The analytical framework introduced in this Article can also, 
ideally, persuade courts to update and reformulate Title VII doctrine 
to better account for the dynamics of contemporary discrimination. 
 Second, on a broader theoretical level, this Article demonstrates 
that the conceptual bifurcation of the causal mechanisms of worker 
inequality into supply side or demand side categories is, in and of 
itself, a political construct disguising the role of institutions and 
markets in producing inequality. Orthodox economic theory, struggle 
as it may, provides the basic template for this binary. According to 
this strain of economics, sustained observed differences in economic 
outcomes between groups are due to a deficiency in the group 
experiencing the inferior outcomes.53 Economists refer to the 
deficiency as one in human capital. Sometimes the deficiency is said 
to be associated with poor schooling opportunities, other times with 
culture, socialization, or motivation. But the thrust of the argument 
is to absolve organizational and market processes of a role in 
producing the differential outcome; the inherent deficiency is 
theorized to occur in pre-market or extra-market processes. This 
framework is woven into the very fabric of Title VII. Every major 
proof structure under Title VII is built on this template, setting up a 
conflict between alleged employee deficiencies, on the one hand, and 
rational employer decisions and efficient work structures, on the 
other. In this view, the trier of fact only needs to choose between 
mutually exclusive explanations for bad worker outcomes. As this 
Article demonstrates, this choice is overly simplistic, as even the 
most basic forms of discriminatory exclusion, such as individual 
disparate treatment, involve an interplay of demand side and supply 
side factors. 
                                                                                                                            
 53. William A. Darity Jr. & Patrick L. Mason, Evidence on Discrimination in Em-
ployment: Codes of Color, Codes of Gender, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 63, 83 (1998). 




 Finally, this Article offers a methodological innovation. I assert 
that a fruitful way to contest the pervasive influence of orthodox 
economic theory on employment discrimination law is to marshal the 
insights and theories from social sciences that take the “social” part 
of their mission seriously.54 Sociology, social psychology, and 
sociologically-grounded business management research on work 
organizations, in particular, are promising fields for challenging 
neoclassical economic foundations of employment discrimination law, 
because they focus on organizational and societal-level systems of 
social stratification. So many of Title VII’s theories of liability and 
legal doctrines focus on the individual—that is, whether and to what 
extent the individual employee is to blame for his or her 
predicament—rather than the interplay between organizational 
structures and individual agency. Disciplines and methodologies that 
attend to the social dynamics inside work organizations and the 
institutional practices that shape employee behavior offer an antidote 
to the inordinate focus in Title VII doctrine on individual employees’ 
education, qualifications, training, merit, performance, and personal 
choices. 
 Sociological and organizational-level understandings of worker 
inequality can also serve as an important supplement to scholarly 
work on unconscious bias in the workplace. In the past fifteen years, 
the science of implicit cognition has achieved a firm foothold in the 
legal field of discrimination law.55 Specifically, many legal scholars 
                                                                                                                            
 54. For a longer explication of this strategy, see Laura T. Kessler, Getting Class, 56 
BUFF. L. REV. 915, 929-30 (2008).  
 55. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination 
Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 477, 477 (2007); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn 
and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2006); Katharine T. 
Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing 
Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1893-94 (2009); Gary Blasi, 
Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. 
REV. 1241, 1241 (2002); Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: 
Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 945-46 (2006); Melissa Hart, Subjective 
Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 741 (2005); Tanya 
Katerí Hernández, One Path for “Post-Racial” Employment Discrimination Cases—The 
Implicit Association Test Research as Social Framework Evidence, 32 L. & INEQ. 309, 310-
11 (2014); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 
969, 969 (2006); Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 
1126 (2012) [hereinafter Kang, Courtroom Bias]; Kang, Trojan Horses, supra note 41, at 
1490; Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of 
“Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2006); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan 
T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and 
Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 998-1003 (2006); Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten 
Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 
354 (2007); Ann C. McGinley, !Viva La Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title 
VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415, 418 (2000); Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual 
Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1093 (2008); Reshma M. Saujani, “The Implicit 
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find special promise in a particular line of research in cognitive 
psychology that measures bias with the Implicit Association Test or 
“IAT.”56 The IAT assesses the existence and strength of racial, 
gender, and other biases by measuring “response latency,” for 
example, how long it takes to make a stereotype-consistent 
association, such as “women” and “crochet,” as compared with the 
time needed to make a stereotype-inconsistent association, such as 
“women” and “strong.” Scholars who promote the IAT emphasize the 
central role of unconscious bias in employer decisions.57 
 Unconscious or “implicit” bias refers to prejudiced judgments that 
may affect our understandings, actions, and decisions.58 It is a type of 
cognitive shortcut that occurs when our brains make quick 
judgments and assessments of people and situations, informed by our 
background, cultural environment, and personal experiences. Many 
legal scholars see this brain science as having the potential to 
transform how we understand and address discrimination 
throughout the law, because so much discrimination law requires 
proof of intent.59 
 Certainly, the science of implicit social cognition has been of some 
assistance in educating judges and policymakers about the nature 
and prevalence of bias, with important victories for this intellectual 
movement.60 Still, there are limitations to the utility of this science as 
a tool for achieving progressive legal change in the employment 
                                                                                                                            
Association Test”: A Measure of Unconscious Racism in Legislative Decision-Making, 8 
MICH. J. RACE & L. 395, 397 (2003); Michael S. Shin, Redressing Wounds: Finding a Legal 
Framework to Remedy Racial Disparities in Medical Care, 90 CAL. L. REV. 2047, 2064-65 
(2002); Audrey J. Lee, Note, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination 
Litigation, 40 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 481, 482 (2005). 
 56. See About the IAT, PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/ 
iatdetails.html [https://perma.cc/N3XJ-DBF5]. For a comprehensive history of the 
development of the field of implicit cognition, and its use in legal projects, see Greenwald & 
Krieger, supra note 55. 
 57. See sources cited supra note 55. 
 58. For example, a manager who sincerely believes that women and men are equally 
suited for a particular job may nevertheless unconsciously associate women with the do-
mestic sphere, and this implicit association might lead him to hire equally qualified men 
over women.  
 59.  See sources cited supra note 55. The seminal contribution is Linda Hamilton 
Krieger’s 1995 law review article, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Ap-
proach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity. See Krieger, supra note 41. 
 60. See, e.g., Kimble v. Wis. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 690 F. Supp. 2d 765, 775-76, 778 
(E.D. Wis. 2010) (recognizing and relying on implicit bias cognitive studies in reaching a 
holding that an employee established a prima facie case of race plus gender discrimination 
when the employer denied the employee a raise on the basis of highly subjective evaluation 
criteria); see also Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”: 
Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and 
Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1353-54 (2008) (noting the important role of implicit 
bias in the EEOC’s and several federal courts’ understanding of employment 
discrimination against family caregivers). 




context. Most research in the field focuses on individual-level 
explanations of worker inequality and, therefore, may lack sufficient 
power to challenge conservative economic and political theories that 
similarly locate the cause of worker inequality inside the individual.61 
In addition, deploying implicit bias research in law reform projects 
has had the unforeseen consequence of perpetuating the 
misconception that biased decisionmaking cannot be controlled, and 
consequently, the belief that employers cannot reasonably be held 
accountable for the resulting discrimination and inequality.62 Worse, 
it risks sending the message that stereotyping is okay, since the 
theory teaches that everyone has bias. This may make discrimination 
seem socially acceptable and lessen the motivation to avoid it. Given 
these risks and limitations, the project of achieving equality in the 
workplace for protected groups requires a more robust account of the 
interactions between bias and structural discrimination than 
advocates of implicit bias research in law sometimes propose.63 
Sociology, social psychology, and related fields in law and society, 
such as new institutionalism and new legal realism, may help here, 
because these fields contribute to our understandings of how 
organizational- and societal-level systems of social stratification 
                                                                                                                            
 61. Moreover, many courts have remained skeptical of implicit bias evidence and have 
refused to find that discrimination existed without a showing of intent. Cf. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 355 (2011) (rejecting relevance of applied social 
framework evidence in the context of class action) (“[L]eft to their own devices most 
managers in any corporation . . . would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for 
hiring and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all.”); see also Krieger & 
Fiske, supra note 55, at 1034 (“Title VII’s operative text prohibits these subtle forms of 
discrimination, but the science of implicit stereotyping has barely begun to influence 
federal disparate treatment jurisprudence. Indeed, from a behavioral realist standpoint, in 
many circuits, judicial conceptions of intergroup bias have actually regressed over the past 
two decades, even as psychological science has surged toward an increasingly refined 
understanding of the ways in which implicit prejudices bias the social judgments and 
choices of even well-meaning people.”); Christopher Cerullo, Note, Everyone’s a Little Bit 
Racist? Reconciling Implicit Bias and Title VII, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 127, 146-54 (2013) 
(discussing cases rejecting implicit bias claims). 
 62. See Stephanie Bornstein, Unifying Antidiscrimination Law Through Stereotype 
Theory, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 919, 940-41 (2016) (suggesting that stereotyping theory 
may be more useful than implicit bias in framing employment discrimination cases); Selmi, 
supra note 42, at 215-20 (critiquing proponents of implicit bias for assuming that implicit 
bias is uncontrollable and for failing to acknowledge that repeated behavior, in the face of 
information that one’s behavior is discriminatory, is not implicit). 
 63. See generally Kessler, supra note 44 (discussing a broad array of institutional 
arrangements and social structures that contribute to worker inequality, including the 
educational system, gender dynamics in families, welfare law, and tax law); cf. Martha 
Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 
20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 1 (2008) (concentrating on “the structures our society has and 
will establish” rather than individuals or defined identity groups, in an effort to move 
“toward a more substantive vision of equality.”). 
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facilitate inequality.64 To succeed in developing a more integrated 
account, however, legal scholars must overcome the presumption that 
unconscious bias and structural contributors to worker inequality are 
unrelated to one another, thereby reinforcing the very same limiting 
frameworks reflected in legal doctrine and embraced by courts. 
Employment discrimination scholarship is roughly divided into two 
subfields, one concentrating on unconscious bias and the other on the 
institutional nature of discrimination. It would be beneficial to the 
field of employment discrimination law to develop an account of the 
interplay among different processes of discriminatory exclusion in 
the workplace. Attending to the dynamic interplay among 
individuals, organizations, and society in producing inequality is 
likely to lead to a better understanding and reduction of gender-
based and other forms of employment discrimination.65  
 Part II of this Article offers an extended fictional hypothetical 
involving work and family conflict, gender and sexuality 
discrimination, and sexual harassment to illustrate the workplace 
domino effect. Through a legal analysis of the factual problem 
presented, Part II then demonstrates how ill-equipped discrimination 
law is to identify and remedy the common domino-like processes that 
cause substantial worker inequalities.  
 Part III examines the prevailing conceptual frameworks that 
social scientists and courts use to explain and understand gender-
based worker inequality. Specifically, Section III.A. reviews social 
science research on gender-based employment discrimination. This 
review demonstrates that social scientists tend to view women’s 
work-related choices, gender bias, and structural features of the 
workplace as mutually exclusive phenomena. Section III.B. turns to 
the analytical frameworks that guide how employment 
discrimination cases are litigated, including disparate treatment, 
systemic disparate treatment, and disparate impact. It shows how 
these frameworks also, almost uniformly, assume that employee’s 
choices and behaviors, employer bias, and exclusionary work 
structures are independent drivers of worker inequality. 
 Part IV sketches a more accurate, multidimensional account of the 
dynamic processes by which worker inequality is created and 
reinforced inside work organizations. This discussion draws from a 
variety of fields, primarily sociology and social psychology, but also 
                                                                                                                            
 64. See Barbara F. Reskin & Denise D. Bielby, A Sociological Perspective on Gender 
and Career Outcomes, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 71 (2005) (explaining how the sociological 
and economic approaches to research on gender and career outcomes differ). 
 65. My comments here are not intended as a broad indictment of implicit bias re-
search or its use in discrimination law. However, productive work remains to be done in 
connecting this research with the organizational literature discussed in this Article. 




from business management research on organizations, new 
institutionalism, feminist legal theory, and critical race theory. The 
research reviewed in Part IV demonstrates that various processes of 
discrimination, such as biased decisionmaking and structural 
impediments to equality, occur simultaneously and combine and 
interact in ways that amplify discrimination, oftentimes with the aid 
of a process of psychological internalization of its targets, resulting in 
tangible harm to employees. 
 Part V explores a number of interventions that follow from this 
Article’s main empirical and theoretical contributions on the 
workplace domino effect. Specifically, Section V.A. discusses 
voluntary measures that employers can adopt to disrupt the feedback 
loops among processes of discrimination documented in this Article. 
These voluntary measures are evidence-based and therefore should 
be effective if there is a commitment to preventing and remedying 
discrimination. In Section V.B., recognizing that employers’ 
commitment to antidiscrimination is oftentimes lacking without the 
risk of liability, I explore litigation strategies and logical revisions to 
several core doctrines in Title VII legal jurisprudence that would 
allow the law to better address the workplace domino effect. 
 In formulating solutions, I proceed from two working 
commitments: First, there is a grave mismatch between what we 
know from social science about how discrimination operates today 
and the model we inherited from fifty years ago, which does not 
account for the dynamic interaction among employee choices, bias, 
and structural features of the workplace that produce inequality. 
This mismatch goes well beyond the oft-discussed failure of Title VII 
to account for the unconscious nature of bias. Second, despite the 
major setbacks that Title VII has suffered in the past several 
decades, and plaintiffs’ consequent difficulties proving employment 
discrimination, developing transformational analytic frameworks 
that can illuminate the social processes of inequality is an important 
and necessary project for employment scholars.66 Disparate 
                                                                                                                            
 66. Given the limitations of using litigation and employment discrimination law to 
end worker inequality, legal scholars increasingly are turning to conceptual frameworks 
that do not turn on proving discrimination on the basis of group membership. For example, 
policy discussions surrounding work and family conflict have progressed over the past few 
decades from demands to end sex discrimination and provide maternity leave to a general 
problem of “family leave,” and more recently, to the concept of “work-life balance” for 
everyone. See Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in 
Workplace Protections, 86 IND. L.J. 1219, 1221 (2011) (discussing this trend). Other 
scholars have proposed laws modeled on minimum labor standards that do not require 
proof of discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: 
American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1341 
(2012) (proposing increased use of “extra-discrimination” approaches that do not focus on 
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treatment law, in particular, is a critical component of this work. 
Although disparate treatment has always served as the practical and 
conceptual core of Title VII, it is now all the more important to 
dedicate energy to reinvigorating individual claims, given the Court’s 
apparent hostility to systemic claims of employment discrimination. 
II.   THE DOMINO EFFECT: A HYPOTHETICAL 
 In order to illustrate the workplace domino effect and the current 
failure of employment discrimination law to address it, I offer in this 
Part a hypothetical. The hypothetical draws from my observations 
and from stories that I have heard and read in the course of my 
research on employment discrimination during my years in law 
teaching. Other information comes from empirical and qualitative 
studies and fact patterns of cases brought under Title VII. I use the 
example of an academic workplace because it is what I know best, 
although the workplace domino effect is likely generalizable to many 
workplaces.  
A.   Hypothetical 
 A talented young scientist takes a full-time position as an 
assistant pharmacology professor on the tenure track at a major 
research university. At the beginning of her sixth year, the faculty 
member will be expected to document her accomplishments, and 
these are reviewed by faculty at other institutions and at various 
levels within the university. The review will use the three criteria of 
research, teaching, and service, with the most important criterion 
being research. 
 In her first year on the faculty, while alone in her office working 
late one evening, an older, tenured male colleague stops by to chat. 
During this conversation, he suggests they go out for a drink. He 
makes a point to explain that his wife is out of town. She is 
uncomfortable, anxious, and not sure how to respond. He is a 
potential resource for her scholarship and professional advancement, 
as they work in closely related fields in pharmacology, and he will 
ultimately vote on her tenure. The combination of his welcome 
professional support and unwelcome romantic attention presents the 
                                                                                                                            
group-based discrimination claims). In a similar vein, some legal scholars have explored 
procedural approaches to addressing discrimination, such as requiring employers to 
establish meaningful procedures for responding to requests for flexible work schedules or 
requiring pay transparency in an effort to improve the ability of employees to negotiate for 
fair pay. See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process: Toward an 
Incentivized Organizational Justice Model of Equal Employment Quality for Caregivers, 
2007 UTAH L. REV. 25, 26-27; Gowri Ramachandran, Pay Transparency, 116 PENN. ST. L. 
REV. 1043, 1043 (2012). 




unsettling possibility that objecting to the latter may cost her the 
former.67 She smiles and explains that her husband is keeping dinner 
warm and politely declines. He leaves, and she packs up her bag and 
immediately goes home, resolving not to work late alone in her office 
anymore. After this incident, the untenured professor tries to avoid 
this colleague whenever possible. She is mostly successful in this 
effort, except for the weekly faculty scholarship lunch, when, on more 
than one occasion, he stands behind her in the buffet line and places 
both hands on her shoulders. She does not share these incidents with 
anyone at work. Although extremely unsettling, she does not believe 
they are serious enough to report, and she also wonders if perhaps 
she sent the wrong signals in the beginning by being extremely 
friendly and seeking out this colleague to discuss their scholarship. 
Better, she decides, just to stay away. 
 The faculty member becomes pregnant the following year, after 
three years on the faculty, and negotiates with her dean to teach an 
overload in her third trimester in return for a “paid” family leave the 
following fall.68 In the past, the department has authorized reduced 
teaching loads on an informal basis for other faculty members for 
various personal and family reasons. For example, one colleague 
received a light teaching load while he was going through a 
contentious divorce; another was given a course release for a 
demanding public service position; a third colleague received a light 
teaching load while going through treatment for a curable cancer, 
although there was no formal request for an accommodation by the 
employee. However, her dean explains that there is no precedent for 
any faculty member being granted a paid family leave, and therefore, 
he offers the “compromise” of permitting her to frontload her 
expected teaching, which she accepts as the best of two less than 
ideal options—taking a significant reduction in salary or doubling 
her workload at the end of pregnancy. Pursuant to university policy, 
she elects to stop her tenure-clock for one academic year. 
 The professor’s teaching evaluations, which were previously 
outstanding, decline while she is teaching the overload during the 
                                                                                                                            
 67. Here, I am paraphrasing Harvard law professor Jeannie Suk Gersen’s description of her 
reaction to an incident of sexual harassment that she experienced. See Jeannie Suk Gersen, The 
Case Against Fox News, NEW YORKER (Aug. 26, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/the-case-against-fox-news [https://perma.cc/T244-PVHT]. 
 68. Cf. Laura T. Kessler, Paid Family Leave in American Law Schools: Findings and 
Open Questions, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 661, 690 (2006) (finding that twenty-seven percent of the 
sampled law schools offered no paid family leave, and that among these law schools, a 
common strategy for wage replacement by legal-academic employees taking family leave is 
to front-load teaching). 
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third trimester of her pregnancy.69 Some of the evaluations directly 
comment on her energy level. Other students are upset about her 
failure to give all reading assignments at the beginning of the 
semester, even though many of her colleagues regularly release 
reading assignments in increments without negative consequences. 
One student complains that the professor, by incorporating her 
scholarship into the reading assignments, wasted their time on her 
“pet projects.”  
 The baby is born without complications in the summer after her 
fourth year on the faculty. Upon returning from her family leave, she 
is assigned especially heavy committee responsibilities, which is only 
fair “because she missed a whole semester.” 
 Given the recent dip in her teaching evaluations, she dedicates 
even more time to preparing her classes and making herself available 
to students. Fearing adverse reactions by students and colleagues to 
her status as a new mother, the professor also goes out of her way to 
strategically minimize or hide her family life at work. Unlike many of 
her colleagues, she avoids displaying pictures of her newborn on her 
office door or her spouse on her desk, maximizes her time in her 
office with her door open, attends all faculty meetings, and accepts 
virtually all requests to attend evening dinners and departmental 
events. The extra energy dedicated to teaching and performing this 
“identity work” takes time away from her scholarship. She squeezes 
in her writing at night, when her family is asleep. Because she has a 
young child at home, she is limited in her ability to travel to research 
conferences where networking takes place. 
 Every morning when the faculty member dresses for work, she 
carefully considers what she will wear. She wants to be taken 
seriously, and must therefore juggle the different impressions created 
by her outfit choices. Formal suits signal authority but come off as 
stuffy. Dresses and skirts are uncomfortable in her cold lab. Yet she 
cannot simply wear slacks, a shirt, and a tie, the uniform of the 
                                                                                                                            
69. There is considerable research demonstrating that student evaluations of faculty 
members’ teaching are infected with unconscious bias. Both male and female students 
generally give lower teaching evaluations to women faculty members than to male faculty 
members, and they give minority faculty members significantly lower evaluations than 
white professors. See Sylvia R. Lazos, Are Student Teaching Evaluations Holding Back 
Women and Minorities? The Perils of “Doing” Gender and Race in the Classroom, in 
PRESUMED INCOMPETENT: THE INTERSECTIONS OF RACE AND CLASS FOR WOMEN IN 
ACADEMIA 164-85 (Gutiérrez y Muhs et al. eds., 2012); Christine Haight Farley, 
Confronting Expectations: Women in the Legal Academy, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 333, 336 
(1996); Daniel S. Hamermesh & Amy Parker, Beauty in the Classroom: Instructors’ 
Pulchritude and Putative Pedagogical Productivity, 24 ECON. EDUC. REV. 369, 373 (2005); 
Deborah J. Merritt, Bias, the Brain, and Student Evaluations of Teaching, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 235, 235-36 (2008).  




tenured male faculty, or show up to work in black jeans and a hoodie, 
like her “cool and talented” junior male colleagues.70 
 The pharmacology professor is ultimately granted tenure, but she 
is given a rating of very good rather than excellent in scholarship. 
Some colleagues feel that she should have published more papers 
than her peers without children, given that she had an extra year on 
her tenure clock. A male colleague, who had his first child before 
tenure, opted not to take a family leave. Rather, he canceled two 
weeks of classes after the birth and scheduled four make-up classes. 
The students, although inconvenienced, did not hold it against him in 
his evaluations, which included statements such as, “Give this man 
tenure.” Although he produced essentially the same quantity and 
quality of scholarship as the female professor, he receives a rating of 
“excellent” in scholarship in his tenure review. 
 Both faculty members are now associate professors. At this point, 
the female professor works, on average, forty-four hours per week. 
(Her spouse works in finance. Although they are committed to 
sharing childcare and housework equally, the pharmacology 
professor spends more time on domestic tasks than her spouse, 
because her schedule is more flexible.) Her male colleague with a 
young child works, on average, about fifty hours per week, because 
his spouse is a stay-at-home parent and serves as the primary 
caregiver of their child. 
 Over time, the male colleague is rewarded with subtle perks and 
resources that facilitate his research, productivity, and reputation. 
For example, he is assigned one of the better administrative 
assistants and top graduate students are steered in his direction to 
work in his lab. His assigned laboratory space is larger and better 
equipped. He is typically given a mid-week teaching schedule 
favorable to traveling to outside conferences. Enrollment caps are 
placed on his classes, which reduces his class sizes and grading 
time.71 His research is featured on the department’s website and in 
                                                                                                                            
 70. The pressures on women to perform their gender exactly right with clothing in the 
workplace and other public realms has been discussed by many authors. Two classic 
statements are Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance 
Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 2547 
(1994), and Patricia J. Williams, Have Pantsuit, Will Travel, NATION (Aug. 27, 2008), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/have-pantsuit-will-travel/ [https://perma.cc/M45L-Y7S8]. 
 71. In-group favoritism, whereby individuals value and favor their own membership 
groups over groups to which they do not belong, is among the most well-established 
phenomena in social psychology. See Marilynn B. Brewer, The Importance of Being We: 
Human Nature and Intergroup Relations, 62 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 728, 729 (2007) (reviewing 
research). Thus, employment discrimination often manifests not as hostility toward the 
out-group, but as in-group favoritism. See Marilynn B. Brewer, In-Group Favoritism: The 
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external communications. He is appointed as the associate dean for 
research, a two-year position that involves some additional 
administrative tasks but which is more than compensated for by its 
reputational value, permanent bump in salary, and accompanying 
course release. This service creates a very favorable reaction by the 
male dean of the department, who views the work as especially 
generous given the male professor’s family commitments. 
 The female professor is given fewer course releases, a less 
favorable teaching schedule, and less competitive students to assist 
with her research (who need more mentoring and support). Because 
there are relatively few women on the faculty, the female faculty 
member is asked to serve on more committees—especially 
committees that represent the department outside the university, 
such as faculty recruitment. This additional service burden causes 
her to lose valuable research time, as well as valuable outside 
consultancies that earn her male colleagues additional income. The 
female faculty member’s scholarship is less promoted in external 
communications by the department, and she is less noted and 
applauded internally for her faculty service than are her male 
colleagues.72 When she occasionally misses a faculty meeting, her 
absence is more likely to be noticed (a few wonder, “Is she home with 
her kid?”), and when she attends, her contributions carry less weight. 
She is limited to a relatively narrow personality range. Students and 
colleagues expect her to be patient and understanding, rather than 
busy and ambitious. 
 After ten years on the faculty, male colleagues with children and 
male and female colleagues without children begin to leapfrog over 
the woman in receiving promotions to full professor, which comes 
with additional prestige, an increased research and travel budget, 
and a higher salary. She has never applied for a promotion to full 
professor. The custom in her department is for one or more colleagues 
                                                                                                                            
Subtle Side of Intergroup Discrimination, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 
INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 59 (David M. Messick & Anne E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996). 
 72. Social psychological research shows that organizational citizenship behaviors such 
as helping others, courtesy, avoiding complaining even when justified (i.e., “good sports-
manship”), and civic engagement (e.g., attending meetings) is evaluated differently for 
women than for men. Being helpful is a female stereotype. Therefore, when women do not 
engage in organizational citizenship behaviors, they are viewed less favorably than identi-
cally behaving men. Moreover, when they do engage in organizational citizenship, it is less 
noted and applauded than when men do. That is, women benefit less from being good citi-
zens, and they are penalized more when they are not. See Tammy D. Allen, Rewarding Good 
Citizens: The Relationship Between Citizenship Behavior, Gender, and Organizational Re-
wards, 36 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 120, 134 (2006); Madeline E. Heilman & Julie J. Chen, 
Same Behavior, Different Consequences: Reactions to Men’s and Women’s Altruistic Citizen-
ship Behavior, 90 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 431, 440 (2005); see also Deborah L. Kidder & Judi 
McLean Parks, The Good Soldier: Who is S(he)?, 22 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 939 passim 
(2001) (theorizing why organizational citizenship behaviors are affected by gender roles). 




who are full professors to encourage or invite associate professors to 
“apply.”73 As no one has ever encouraged her, she has not felt 
comfortable asking to be considered for a promotion. In any case, she 
thinks the effort would be futile. Seven of the ten full professors are 
men and none has young children. There are no written standards for 
promotion to full professor; the decision is made after a discussion 
and simple vote and recommendation of the existing full professors. 
She is nationally recognized, has made important contributions to 
her field, and her publication record and grant-funding history are 
equal or superior to at least half of her colleagues who are full 
professors. Yet, she decides, it would be better not to push it for now. 
In the big scheme of things, she should feel lucky, she thinks to 
herself. As a tenured professor, she has reached the top of the 
privilege and status hierarchy—by all external measures, she enjoys 
levels of autonomy, prestige, and economic reward that are unusual 
compared to the average worker.74 
                                                                                                                            
 73. This tapping process is common in professional workplaces and is illustrated by 
the controversial remarks of Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella, who, at a 2014 conference in-
tended to celebrate women in computing, suggested that women in technology should not 
ask for raises but rather “trust that the system would reward them.” See Nick Wingfield, 
Microsoft’s Nadella Sets Off a Furor on Women’s Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2014, at B1. “Be-
cause that’s good karma,” according to Nadella. Id. “It’ll come back because somebody’s 
going to know that’s the kind of person that I want to trust.” Id. Read between the lines, 
Nadella’s remarks betray an unfavorable view of women who are as pushy as men in ask-
ing for raises. The irony, of course, is that when women do not negotiate for raises or pro-
motions, as they so often do not, courts have interpreted their unassertiveness as evidence 
of their lack of interest, placing them in a classic double bind. See Vicki Schultz, Telling 
Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Work-
place in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 
passim (1990). See generally LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON’T ASK: 
NEGOTIATION AND THE GENDER DIVIDE (2007). 
 74. This rationalization is consistent with research on gender-based differences in job 
satisfaction. All else being equal, women tend to report higher overall job satisfaction than 
men, irrespective of whether they face gender barriers or discrimination at work. There-
fore, reported job satisfaction is not a reliable measure of a fair or equal workplace. See 
Andrew E. Clark, Job Satisfaction and Gender: Why Are Women So Happy at Work?, 4 LAB. 
ECON. 341, 365 (1997) (finding that women have higher job satisfaction than men because 
they have low expectations); William Magee, Anxiety, Demoralization, and the Gender Dif-
ference in Job Satisfaction, 69 SEX ROLES 308, 318 (2013) (“Women who report symptoms of 
demoralization [by work] report being more satisfied with their jobs than men who report 
demoralization.”); P. J. Sloane & H. Williams, Job Satisfaction, Comparison Earnings, and 
Gender, 14 LAB. 473, 496 (2000) (finding that women express themselves as more satisfied 
with their job than men, despite lower pay); cf. A. Sousa-Poza & A. A. Sousa-Poza, Gender 
Differences in Job Satisfaction in Great Britain, 1991–2000: Permanent or Transitory?, 10 
APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 691, 694 (2003) (finding that women’s job satisfaction in England 
halved from 1991-2000 because of increased expectations). 
 In addition to the “low expectations” hypothesis, there are two alternative explanations 
for women’s relatively higher levels of job satisfaction despite their experience of discrimi-
nation. Some studies suggest that men and women value aspects of a job differently, so 
objective reward measures (such as pay) may mean less to women than men when com-
pared with measures such as flexibility or the intrinsic returns of work. See Keith A. Bend-
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B.   Legal Analysis 
 In the hypothetical scenario presented, the employee has limited 
rights under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), the Family 
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), or Title VII. Under Title VII, she has 
a right to work in an environment free of sex-based unwelcome 
conduct that is intimating, hostile, or abusive. However, isolated and 
sporadic incidents such as those that she endured do not rise to the 
level of illegality,75 even though her colleague’s behavior was 
troubling enough to cause her to avoid him, which interfered with her 
work and resulted in potentially lost opportunities of support for her 
development as a young scholar. Moreover, courts generally have not 
permitted plaintiffs to aggregate sexual harassment evidence with 
evidence of other “non-sexual” forms of sex discrimination (such as 
sex-based disparate treatment) to sustain a sexual harassment 
claim.76 Therefore, the generalized conditions that have made it 
difficult for her to flourish in her position will, as a matter of law, be 
sliced and diced into smaller, discrete harms that seem relatively 
trivial when considered out of context. Finally, because the harassing 
colleague did not have the authority to effect a significant change in 
the professor’s employment status—in the tenure process, he was 
just one vote on a larger faculty—the professor’s claim for sexual 
harassment against the university would likely be foreclosed in any 
case.77 She did not report the harassment, and most courts would find 
that this constituted an unreasonable failure to take advantage of 
                                                                                                                            
er et al., Job Satisfaction and Gender Segregation, 57 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 479, 481 
(2005); Andrew E. Clark, What Really Matters in a Job? Hedonic Measurement Using Quit 
Data, 8 LAB. ECON. 223, 224 (2001). A second theory is that dissatisfied women self-select 
out of the labor market, a form of selection bias, but studies have refuted this hypothesis. 
See, e.g., Clark, Job Satisfaction and Gender, supra, at 343; Alfonso Sousa-Poza & Andrés 
A. Sousa-Poza, The Effect of Job Satisfaction on Labor Turnover by Gender: An Analysis for 
Switzerland, 36 J. SOCIO-ECON. 895, 910 (2007). 
 75. Courts have narrowly defined sexual harassment as severe and pervasive conduct 
that a reasonable person would consider intimidating, hostile, or abusive. See Burlington 
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 
(1998); see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (noting 
that Title VII was not meant to be “a general civility code for the American workplace.”); 
Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N (Mar. 19, 1990), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/currentissues.html [https://perma.cc/ 
FL6A-ETVW] (“Unless the conduct is quite severe, a single incident or isolated incidents of 
offensive sexual conduct or remarks generally do not create an abusive environment.”). 
 76. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 
1713-14 (1993) (discussing the disaggregation of sexual harassment from disparate treat-
ment, so that “only overtly sexual conduct counts toward establishing hostile work envi-
ronment harassment and that nonsexual conduct must be considered—if at all—as a sepa-
rate form of disparate treatment.”). 
 77. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 431 (2013) (requiring proof of negli-
gence to sustain a claim of sexual harassment by a coworker). 




preventive and corrective opportunities under these circumstances,78 
even though she responded like most victims in these situations: 
through avoidance.79 
 Under the PDA, she was entitled to a paid family leave without 
teaching an overload if the employer provided paid leave to other 
similarly situated workers. If so, by denying paid leave, the employer 
was arguably discriminating against her based on pregnancy. 
However, the employer may interpose a valid reason for the 
distinction, arguing, for example, that a paid course release was 
provided to her colleague for a comparably different situation, 
because his leave during his period of public service was related to 
his professional work and could ultimately benefit the school’s 
reputation.80 If this distinction has a legitimate institutional basis, 
the PDA claim may be unavailing. 
 Fortunately, unlike many part-time and low-wage workers, the 
professor was eligible for job-protected family leave under the 
FMLA.81 The birth of her child was a qualifying event,82 and she had 
at least 1,250 hours of service for the university during the twelve 
months prior to her leave for an employer with fifty or more 
employees.83 However, the FMLA did not give her the ability to insist 
on a paid leave. 
                                                                                                                            
 78. See Hébert, supra note 31, at 733 (“Women who use more informal and interper-
sonal methods of dealing with sexual harassment are often portrayed as ‘doing nothing,’ a 
characterization that makes it more likely that courts will find their failure to take proac-
tive steps to deal with the harassment unreasonable.” (footnote omitted)). 
 79. See Beiner, supra note 32, at 315-16 (reporting that half of women who are sexually 
harassed are reluctant to report the harassment because they do not think it is serious enough). 
 80. Identifying acceptable comparators is an eternal challenge for employment dis-
crimination plaintiffs. This example brings to mind the recent Supreme Court decision of 
Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). Peggy Young worked as a de-
livery driver for United Parcel Service (UPS). Id. at 1344. When she became pregnant, her 
doctor advised her not to lift more than twenty pounds during her first twenty weeks of 
pregnancy and no more than ten pounds thereafter. Id. UPS refused to transfer her to a 
desk job, even though it had provided this accommodation to many men who experienced 
comparable short-term disabilities, and even to men who had lost their Department of 
Transportation driving certifications for drunk driving. Id. at 1347. UPS maintained the 
position that these employees held were not appropriate comparators, because their situa-
tions were allegedly too different to qualify as “similarly situated.” Id. Ultimately, the 
Court held that these employees could, as a matter of law, serve as appropriate compara-
tors to create an inference of discrimination, but only if the plaintiff can demonstrate that 
the defendant accommodates a “large percentage” of such workers, while failing to accom-
modate a “large percentage” of pregnant workers. Id. at 1354. For a critique of the judici-
ary’s almost religious devotion to comparators in discrimination law, and the limiting ef-
fects of this methodology, see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 
YALE L.J. 728 (2011). 
 81. See Kessler, supra note 52, at 422-23 (discussing features of the FMLA that limit 
its coverage primarily to economically privileged workers). 
 82. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 83. See id. §§ 2611(2), 2611(4) (2012). 
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 The professor may have a retaliation claim for being given heavy 
committee work upon return from her family leave. An employer is 
prohibited from retaliating against an employee for taking FMLA 
leave,84 and the Supreme Court has defined retaliation broadly as 
any action that a reasonable employee would find materially 
adverse.85 However, courts have often faltered in enforcing the law’s 
goal of achieving equal employment opportunity when retaliation 
takes on more subtle, less tangible, non-economic forms.86 The 
employer therefore might argue, for example, that in the larger 
scheme of things, the heavy committee assignment did not constitute 
a meaningful change in work responsibilities. Alternatively, the 
employer might argue that her assignments were consistent with the 
practice of periodically assigning faculty to heavy-workload 
committees. On a small faculty, it may be difficult to show a gender-
based pattern. Moreover, although the law is still developing, a few 
district courts have held that a claim of retaliation under the FMLA 
must meet a higher “but-for” causation standard rather than the 
easier-to-prove “motivating factor” standard.87 
                                                                                                                            
 84. See id. § 2615(a)(1) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (2012). 
 85. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67-68 (2006). Although 
the Burlington standard characterized how harmful retaliation must be to fall within Title 
VII’s antiretaliation provision, it has been widely applied to other federal discrimination 
statutes, including the FMLA. See Michael C. Harper, Fashioning a General Common Law 
for Employment in an Age of Statutes, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1281, 1325-27 (2015). 
 86. See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Parsing the Meaning of “Adverse Employment Ac-
tion” in Title VII Disparate Treatment, Sexual Harassment, and Retaliation Claims: What 
Should Be Actionable Wrongdoing?, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 623, 624 (2003); Brian A. Riddell & 
Richard A. Bales, Adverse Employment Action in Retaliation Cases, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 
313, 313-15 (2005); Autumn George, Comment, “Adverse Employment Action”—How Much 
Harm Must Be Shown to Sustain a Claim of Discrimination Under Title VII?, 60 MERCER 
L. REV. 1075, 1107-08 (2009). 
 87. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court held that the “mixed-motive” proof struc-
ture is unavailable to prove retaliation claims under Title VII. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. 
Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360-61 (2013). As a result, for Title VII retaliation claims, 
employees are now subject to a much more demanding standard that a protected activity—
such as complaining about discrimination, filing a discrimination charge, resisting har-
assment, or cooperating in a discrimination investigation—was the “but-for cause” of the 
employer’s retaliation against the employee. See id. The Court determined Title VII retali-
ation claims “must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation.” Id. 
This holding eliminated the less onerous motivating-factor standard of adjudicating Title 
VII retaliation claims, in which a claimant could show “race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin was a motivating factor for—and not necessarily the but-for factor in—the chal-
lenged employment action.” Id. at 2528. 
 A Department of Labor regulation that predates Nassar, section 825.220(c), provides 
that “employers cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment 
actions, such as hiring, promotions or disciplinary actions.” Id. The “factor” language 
makes clear that the “but for” standard should not apply to FMLA retaliation cases. The 
Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits and several district courts in other circuits have rea-
soned that the regulation deserves Chevron deference, see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and, therefore, have held that the proper causation 
standard for retaliation claims under the FMLA is mixed-motive, see Woods v. START 
 




 Beyond the immediate circumstances surrounding her family 
leave, note also, the FMLA does not provide our professor with a 
right to a flexible work arrangement or reduced work hours to care 
for her healthy child after the initial twelve-week leave period.  
 The professor could also allege intentional “sex-plus” discrimination 
because of her status as a woman with children. “Sex-plus” 
discrimination is discrimination based on sex in conjunction with some 
other characteristic, such as having young children.88 Proceeding on 
this theory, she could argue that she was treated unfairly vis-à-vis her 
male colleague with a young child who was given a lighter teaching 
load, better administrative support, the best Ph.D. candidates, 
superior laboratory space and equipment, greater presence on the 
department’s website, a more favorable teaching schedule, more course 
releases, an appointment as the research dean, and, ultimately, 
promotion to full professor. Under the sex-plus doctrine, the fact that 
some women without young children were treated favorably or 
promoted to full professor should not automatically defeat her claim. 
Moreover, according to the “mixed-motive” rule, she could potentially 
establish liability simply by showing that gender motivated her 
employer’s actions,89 rather than having to prove that gender was the 
but-for cause of its actions favoring her male colleague.  
                                                                                                                            
Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2017); Egan v. Del. River Port 
Auth., 851 F.3d 263, 274 (3d Cir. 2017); Hunter v. Valley View Local Sch., 579 F.3d 688, 
691-92 (6th Cir. 2009); Chase v. U.S. Postal Serv., 149 F. Supp. 3d 195, 210 (D. Mass. 
2016), aff’d on other grounds, 843 F.3d 553, 559 n.2 (1st Cir. 2016); cf. Walters v. Mayo 
Clinic Health Sys.—Eau Claire Hosp., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 3d 1071, 1080 (W.D. Wis. 2015) 
(“[T]he FMLA regulation at issue here contains the express language . . . necessary to allow 
for something other than ‘but for causation.’ ”). However, a few district courts have reached 
the opposite conclusion, treating Nassar as a controlling precedent for FMLA retaliation 
claims and therefore applying the but-for causation standard to such claims. See Gourdeau 
v. City of Newton, 238 F. Supp. 3d 179, 183-95 (D. Mass. 2017); Jones v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
No. 2:14-CV-1640-WMA, 2016 WL 4259753, at *4-6 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 12, 2016); Taylor v. 
Rite Aid Corp., 993 F. Supp. 2d 551, 567 (D. Md. 2014). Many courts, including the Fifth 
and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeal, have simply avoided deciding the question by hold-
ing that the plaintiff’s FMLA retaliation claim could survive both the “but for” and “moti-
vating factor” standard, or neither. See, e.g., Castay v. Ochsner Clinic Found., 604 F. App’x 
355, 356 n.2 (5th Cir. 2015); Malin v. Hospira, Inc., 762 F.3d 552, 562 n.3 (7th Cir. 2014); 
Elzeneiny v. District of Columbia, 195 F. Supp. 3d 207, 221 (D.D.C. 2016). The Supreme 
Court has thus far declined to take up the question, see Bartels v. S. Motors of Savannah, 
Inc., 681 F. App’x 834, 840 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 358 (2017); therefore, 
uncertainty remains in many circuits about the proper causation standard for FMLA retal-
iation claims. 
 88. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971). 
 89. With the exception of age discrimination claims, which are subject to a strict “but-
for” causation standard, see Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009), an 
employee may prevail in one of two ways in a disparate treatment case. First, if the fact-
finder believes the employer’s decision was motivated exclusively by discriminatory 
reasons. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993); Tex. Dep’t of 
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
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 However, even with the benefit of these plaintiff-friendly Title VII 
doctrines (sex-plus and mixed-motive), success will turn on at least 
two challenges. First, she will have to prove that the subtle actions 
“favoring” her male colleague with children were, in effect, adverse 
employment actions disfavoring her. It will be difficult to 
demonstrate, for example, that being assigned a less competent 
administrative assistant or graduate students, not being mentored or 
featured on the department’s website, or even being assigned inferior 
lab space,90 constitute adverse employment actions,91 and proving 
some of these matters would involve challenging satellite 
determinations of the qualifications and competence of staff and 
students assigned to work for her. Second, she will need to 
demonstrate that her performance is comparable to or better than 
her male colleague’s. This may prove difficult where decisionmaking 
processes are opaque and guided by subjective factors, as is the case 
                                                                                                                            
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Second, she may prevail if she proves that the employer’s decision 
was motivated by discriminatory and nondiscriminatory reasons, the latter being sufficient 
to motivate the adverse decision. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 93-94 
(2003); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1989). In the latter “mixed-
motive” situation, according to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the employer is in violation of 
Title VII, because it took account of the employee’s protected status in making an 
employment decision. However, if the employer would have made the same decision in the 
absence of the discrimination, the plaintiff’s remedy is limited to declaratory and injunctive 
relief, attorney’s fees, and costs (i.e., no damages, back pay, or reinstatement). Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2012).  
 90. See, e.g., Summy-Long v. Pa. State Univ., 226 F. Supp. 3d 371, 417-21 (M.D. Pa. 
2016) (holding that a female pharmacology professor was not subjected to adverse 
employment actions by reduction of her laboratory space, delayed placement of her profile 
on website, or alleged mistreatment by administrative staff); Mitchell v. Vanderbilt Univ., 
No. 3:01-1578, 2003 WL 24135107, at *9 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2003) (holding that 
reduction of a microbiology professor’s lab space “does not rise to the level of a firing, 
demotion, or loss of benefits”). 
 91. The employer’s intent can be established with either direct or indirect evidence. 
Direct evidence is evidence that directly proves a fact, without an inference—for example, 
the statement by a supervisor, “I did not promote you because you are a woman.” It is 
unlikely that the professor will have direct evidence, because most employers have trained 
their supervisors not to express any discriminatory motives they might harbor. See Chad 
Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity Presumption in Title VII and 
the Return to “No Cause” Employment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1177, 1207 (2003) (noting that as 
soon as Title VII became law, “no sensible employer would admit that it based a decision 
on one of the prohibited classifications.”); see also Mark Schwartz, et al., Ass’n Corp. 
Counsel, Mixed-Motive Cases: What Now After Desert Palace v. Costa, ACC DOCKET, Mar. 
2004, at 58-59 (“[Y]our company should be even more vigilant in educating its supervisors 
and employees not to tell jokes or use derogatory or stereotypical language in the 
workplace based on race, national origin, religion, gender, age, or other protected factors. 
You should review your company’s diversity training and equal employment compliance 
programs to ensure that they include discussion about jokes and off-color remarks. 
Although truly isolated jokes or comments still should not be admissible as “stray remarks” 
or otherwise, the prevalence of such comments may be admissible to establish that the 
company facilitates prejudices that lead to unlawful discrimination.”). 




in many employment contexts. When it comes to subjective 
evaluations of employee performance, courts have tended to defer to 
employers’ determinations. She could argue that her employer’s 
actions were still to some extent influenced by the seeming 
incongruity of being a mother with young children and a scientist. 
Perhaps. But it will be tough to do so without direct evidence, such as 
hostile statements evidencing a discriminatory motive.  
 Finally, under the proof structure for intentional disparate 
treatment, the discriminatory and legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
“reasons” for an employer’s decisions will be viewed as mutually 
exclusive. She is working “twice as hard” to combat biased teaching 
evaluations and potential negative perceptions of being a mother, 
which the employer, in the case of assigning her a teaching overload 
in her third trimester of pregnancy, did not take measures to combat 
and may have facilitated. She has also been given a greater volume of 
service and other assignments that are inconsistent with research. In 
contrast, her male colleague has flourished under ideal work 
conditions that included, among other benefits, resources and 
support that freed up his time for research, as well as grooming for 
leadership. When sustained over a career, the differential allocation 
of resources, while seemingly inconsequential in isolation, are likely 
to accrete, diminishing productivity and other indicia of success. 
Finally, the job—its hours and requirements—is designed around the 
assumption that the worker who occupies her position has the benefit 
of a stay-at-home partner to cover the domestic-side of life. Yet in the 
legal analysis of her disparate treatment claim under the established 
disparate treatment proof structure, her performance will be treated 
as an independent, legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for the 
employer’s actions. And because she never applied for a promotion, 
her employer will claim that she is not a full professor because of her 
apparent lack of interest, rather than any discriminatory motive. As 
Vicki Schultz’s scholarship has thoroughly documented, courts have 
generally sided with employers when they raise this “lack of interest” 
argument, even if the apparent lack of interest is a result of the 
chilling effects of an employer’s discriminatory practices.92  
 Thus, the PDA, the FMLA, and Title VII, as presently configured, 
are inadequate solutions to gender-based discrimination against 
family caregivers, or, more generally, to the cascading patterns of 
discrimination that result in substantial worker inequality. As this 
example illustrates, although the PDA protects pregnant workers 
from some forms of differential treatment, it is helpful only in 
                                                                                                                            
 92. Schultz, supra note 73. 
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situations where comparable non-pregnant employees are treated 
more favorably. It is completely silent on issues of caregiver 
discrimination that occur after pregnancy.93 The FMLA does mandate 
some recognition of the real effects of caregiving, but it does so only 
in the context of birth or serious illness, ignoring the burdens 
imposed by the everyday demands of caregiving, which can continue 
for many years. Finally, and crucially, even the less onerous “mixed-
motive” theory of intentional discrimination is generally unable to 
account for the dynamic interactions among individual employee 
choices, bias, and discriminatory structures inside the workplace. 
That is, bias and structural discrimination are mutually 
reinforcing—and they produce so-called “real differences” that are 
then accepted in disparate treatment law as nondiscriminatory 
explanations and justifications for an employer’s adverse 
employment actions. 
 Although the domino effect has profound consequences, including 
the glass ceiling, gender- and race-based job segregation, and 
tokenism, courts are generally predisposed to attribute such stark 
patterns of inequality to external factors, such as the gendered 
division of family labor, minority groups’ lack of education, skills, 
knowledge, or experience, and the absence of qualified, diverse 
applicants. In this view, individual employees’ qualifications and 
ability to perform their jobs preexist any interaction with the 
workplace, and the employer is not responsible for shaping or even 
responding to the disadvantages that result from discrimination. 
 My hypothetical focused primarily on individual disparate 
treatment, retaliation, and harassment claims, because the great 
majority of employment discrimination cases involve claims asserted 
by individual plaintiffs. Although significant in number, these cases 
do not usually attract as much publicity or attention as large class 
actions or suits challenging affirmative action plans. However, 
disparate treatment and other individual claims are of enormous 
significance to addressing employment discrimination, even though 
they do not receive as much attention, because they are the largest 
part of the caseload.94 
 Finally, although there will of course be variation, it is important 
to highlight that the domino effect illustrated in this hypothetical 
will be experienced to a greater or lesser extent by any employee who 
does not conform with the ideal-worker norm. This would include, for 
                                                                                                                            
 93. See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process: Toward an 
Organizational Justice Model of Equal Employment Quality for Caregiver, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 
25, 32-33; Kessler, supra note 52, at 399 (“[C]ourts . . . have uniformly held that needs or 
conditions of a child that require a mother’s presence are not within the scope of the PDA.”). 
 94. See sources cited supra note 30. 




example, gender-nonconforming men who do significant family 
caregiving work; employees with serious illnesses or disabilities or 
employees caring for others with serious illnesses or disabilities, 
including children, elderly parents, extended family,95 and friends;96 
and perhaps even single employees who are responsible for all of 
their self-care.97 The domino effect is also likely to be set in motion by 
culturally-grounded dress or grooming practices, as well as primary 
language differences. Finally, the idea of the domino effect might even 
be productively applied to understand the dynamics of simple status-
based discrimination, given that stereotyping and discrimination 
often trigger adaptive responses by individuals that may negatively 
influence their job-related choices, energy, or performance. 
III.   DOWNPLAYING THE DOMINO EFFECT:  
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND TITLE VII 
 In this Part, in an effort to illustrate my larger point about 
employment discrimination law’s inattention to the domino-like 
dynamics of discrimination in the workplace, I review some of the 
social science research exploring the reasons for women’s 
compromised labor market position in the United States, as well as 
the three basic proof structures for litigating employment 
discrimination cases under Title VII. This analysis demonstrates that 
a great deal of social science research on gender inequality in the 
workplace, as well as all of Title VII’s major proof structures, tend to 
ignore or downplay the interrelationships among individual employee 
choices and characteristics, discriminatory bias, and structural 
impediments to sex equality. The research I review focuses on the 
particular problem of workplace gender discrimination. However, the 
larger insights of this Part are equally applicable to other 
disadvantaged identities, such as race and sexuality. 
A.   Social Science Research 
 Women’s compromised labor market position in the United States 
has long drawn scholarly attention from many disciplines, including 
economics, psychology, sociology, gender studies, social work, law, 
business, and management studies. Three competing frameworks 
                                                                                                                            
 95. See generally Peggie Smith, Elder Care, Work, and Gender: The Work-Family 
Issue of the 21st Century, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 351 (2004). 
 96. See generally Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2007). 
 97. See generally Adam Romero, Methodological Descriptions: “Feminist” and “Queer” 
Legal Theories, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY: INTIMATE ENCOUNTERS, 
UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS 179 (Martha Albertson Fineman, Jack E. Jackson & Adam 
P. Romero eds., 2009); Martha T. McCluskey, Caring for Workers, 55 ME. L. REV. 313 (2002). 
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have emerged for understanding gendered patterns of inequality in 
the workplace: individuals’ personal choices or preferences, gender 
bias, and structural barriers to equality attributable to the 
organization of work itself. This Section summarizes these competing 
explanations. It also explores some of the reasons researchers fail to 
integrate them or explore their interrelationships, including the 
tendency of scholars trained in different disciplines to adopt varying 
conceptual frameworks.  
 1.   Choice and Essential Difference  
 According to one body of research, gender-based workplace 
inequity persists because women do not have the same ability and 
motivation to achieve at work as men. Economists describe this in 
terms of women’s lesser human capital,98 rational or “statistical” 
discrimination,99 or the efficiency of sexual divisions of labor.100 
Evolutionary biologists and psychologists explain gender inequity in 
the workplace in terms of the basic structure of the brain and other 
physiological phenomena. According to this framework, genetic or 
hormonal differences could cause women to be less competitive or 
ambitious at work than men.101 Courts and legal scholars adopting 
these perspectives assert that legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons 
unrelated to an employee’s sex—such as lack of availability for full-
time work, overtime, or work-related travel; unwillingness to 
relocate; and risk aversion—explain sex-based inequality in the 
workplace.102 These frameworks share the assumption that unequal 
employment patterns like the glass ceiling, gender-wage gap, and sex 
segregation are caused by the differences, limitations, choices, or 
needs of female employees that are exogenous to the workplace. 
                                                                                                                            
 98. GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 43-44 (1991); June O’Neill & 
Solomon Polachek, Why the Gender Gap in Wages Narrowed in the 1980s, 11 J. LAB. ECON. 
205, 207 (1993); Alison J. Wellington, Changes in the Male/Female Wage Gap, 1976–85, 28 
J. HUM. RESOURCES 383, 386 (1993).  
 99. Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR 
MARKETS 3-5 (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds., 1973); Edmund S. Phelps, The 
Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659, 659-661 (1972). 
 100. Gary S. Becker, Human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor, 3 J. 
LAB. ECON. S33, S36-S39 (1985). 
 101. SUSAN PINKER, THE SEXUAL PARADOX: EXTREME MEN, GIFTED WOMEN, AND THE 
REAL GENDER GAP 215-20 (2008); Stephen M. Colarelli et. al., Women, Power, and Sex 
Composition in Small Groups: An Evolutionary Perspective, 27 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 
163, 169 (2006). 
 102. See Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994); EEOC v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 348 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Stout v. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 862 (5th Cir. 2002); Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination 
and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 836-37, 850-51 (2001). 




Economists and other social scientists often refer to these theories as 
“supply side” explanations.103 
 2.   Bias 
 A second body of research identifies gender bias as a major 
contributor to women’s workplace inequality. From this perspective, 
stereotypes about women and employees with family responsibilities 
cause employers to irrationally discriminate on the basis of sex and 
gender. For example, decades of social science research has repeatedly 
found that women face distinct social penalties for doing the very 
things that are expected to lead to success in the workplace.104 
 Social science research also tells us that pregnant women and 
mothers experience a uniquely hostile and pervasive form of gender 
discrimination, regardless of qualifications or job performance.105 For 
example, in laboratory experiments, pregnant applicants are more 
likely to be assessed as lazy, complainers, and moody compared with 
non-pregnant applicants, especially when applying for stereotypically 
male jobs.106 Similarly, in investigations of discrimination against 
mothers in the laboratory and the labor market, equally qualified 
and credentialed women job applicants with children are rated as 
less competent; less committed; less suitable for hire, promotion, and 
training; and deserving of lower salaries compared with women 
applicants who are not parents.107 Research also finds that mothers 
                                                                                                                            
 103. See Reskin, supra note 21, at 248. 
 104. Madeline E. Heilman, Gender Stereotypes and Workplace Bias, 32 RES. 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 113 passim (2012) (discussing the perceived lack of fit between 
the attributes expected to succeed in high-level organizational positions—such as being 
ambitious, task-focused, assertive, decisive, self-reliant, analytical, logical, and objective—
and the expected attributes of women—being kind, caring, considerate, warm, friendly, 
collaborative, obedient, respectful, and intuitive); Julie E. Phelan & Laurie A. Rudman, 
Prejudice Toward Female Leaders: Backlash Effects and Women’s Impression Management 
Dilemma, 4 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS, 807 passim (2010) (reviewing re-
search demonstrating the double bind that female leaders face in the workplace, in that that 
they are required to display agency to overcome the lack of fit between their gender and lead-
ership, yet when they do so, they risk hiring discrimination and prejudice). 
 105. See Cecilia L. Ridgeway & Shelly J. Correll, Motherhood as a Status Characteristic, 
60 J. SOC. ISSUES 683, 697 (2004) (“The biased evaluations and behavioral responses elicited 
by the status of the mother role are similar in type to those elicited by the status associated 
with sex itself. But, by our account, the biases evoked by the mother role will be more strong-
ly discriminatory in most workplace settings than those produced by sex status alone because 
motherhood is seen as more directly indicative of workplace performance than is sex.”). 
 106. Michelle R. Hebl et al., Hostile and Benevolent Reactions Toward Pregnant Women: 
Complimentary Interpersonal Punishments and Rewards that Maintain Traditional Roles, 
92 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1499, 1508-10 (2007). 
 107. See, e.g., Shelley J. Correll, Stephen Benard & In Paik, Getting a Job: Is There a 
Motherhood Penalty?, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1297, 1298 (2007). In the laboratory portion of this 
study, participants evaluated a pair of simulated job applicants who differed only on 
parental status. Id. at 1309. The researchers then submitted similar applications to real 
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face discrimination in work evaluations, even when there is 
indisputable evidence that they are competent and committed to paid 
work.108 These findings are consistent with studies finding that 
working women who become mothers “trade perceived competence for 
perceived warmth.”109 
 Working men who become fathers do not make this trade.110 
Moreover, when it comes to wages, male employees are not generally 
penalized, and in fact often experience a wage premium, for being 
married or a parent.111 However, there is some evidence of a 
threshold effect for men; men who cross the gender line by taking a 
family leave, for example, suffer many of the same biases that 
working mothers do.112 For example, in experimental studies, men 
who were depicted as taking parental leave were less likely to be 
recommended for work rewards, such as admission to a fast-track 
executive training program, promotions, salary increases, and the 
assignment of high-profile projects.113 Indeed, evidence from human 
resources suggests that fathers who request flexible work 
arrangements or go part-time may actually experience greater 
workplace hostility than mothers who do.114 
                                                                                                                            
job openings. Id. at 1327-28. The results closely corresponded to those in the laboratory; 
mothers were called back for interviews about half as often as nonmothers. Id. at 1330. 
 108. Stephen Benard & Shelley J. Correll, Normative Discrimination and the 
Motherhood Penalty, 24 GENDER & SOC’Y 616, 639 (2010). 
 109. Amy J.C. Cuddy et al., When Professionals Become Mothers, Warmth Doesn’t Cut 
the Ice, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 701, 701-05 (2004). 
 110. Id.; see also Kathleen Fuegen et al., Mothers and Fathers in the Workplace: How 
Gender and Parental Status Influence Judgments of Job-Related Competence, 60 J. SOC. 
ISSUES 737, 737-39, 748 (2004).  
 111. Joni Hersch & Leslie S. Stratton, Household Specialization and the Male Marriage 
Wage Premium, 54 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 78, 93 (2000) (finding a wage premium for 
married men as compared with unmarried men that is not explained by time spent on 
domestic tasks); Melissa J. Hodges & Michelle J. Budig, Who Gets the Daddy Bonus? 
Organizational Hegemonic Masculinity and the Impact of Fatherhood on Earnings, 24 
GENDER & SOC’Y 717, 740-41 (2010) (finding that the earnings bonus for fatherhood 
persists after controlling for an array of differences, including human capital, labor supply, 
family structure, and wives’ employment status, and that married white men with high 
socioeconomic status receive the largest fatherhood earnings bonus); see also Rebecca 
Glauber, Race and Gender in Families and at Work: The Fatherhood Wage Premium, 22 
GENDER & SOC’Y 8, 24-25 (2008) (finding that a positive wage differential for fatherhood 
persists for married men even after controlling for a host of other relevant factors that 
include human capital, work hours, and effort, but that black men receive a smaller 
premium for fatherhood). 
 112. Tammy D. Allen & Joyce E. A. Russell, Parental Leave of Absence: Some Not So 
Family-Friendly Implications, 29 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 166, 185 (1999). 
 113. Id. at 174, 179 & tbl.2, 185. 
 114. Alice H. Eagly & Valerie J. Steffen, Gender Stereotypes, Occupational Roles, and 
Beliefs About Part-Time Employees, PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q., Sept. 1986, at 252, 252-61; Joan 
C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who 
Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 101-02 (2003). 




 Overall, researchers adopting this perspective focus on irrational 
gender bias as the primary generator of workplace inequality for 
women and employees with family responsibilities.115  
 3.   Structural Explanations 
 A third body of social science research locates a major cause of 
gender inequality at work in the mismatch between the needs of 
employees with family responsibilities and the institutional structure 
of work.116 According to this research, cultural norms and 
expectations about the ideal worker who has an adult family member 
at home on a full-time basis who can take care of family and home 
responsibilities do not reflect the reality of today’s employees.117 
These researchers note that most families are no longer structured 
around the full-time breadwinner and full-time homemaker ideal.118 
Yet the workplace and other societal institutions have not kept up 
with the reality of modern families.119 Researchers adopting this 
perspective largely frame women’s workplace inequality as a problem 
arising from the gendered structure of work. Lawyers and activists 
advocating family-friendly workplace policies have drawn on this 
                                                                                                                            
 115. See, e.g., JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN 
AND CLASS MATTER 93 (2010). 
 116. Id. at 43-44. 
 117. Id. 
 118. As of 2006, sixty-two percent of married-couple families had two earners, while 
only twenty-four percent depended solely on a husband’s income. Stella Potter Cromartie, 
Labor Force Status of Families: A Visual Essay, MONTHLY LAB. REV., July/Aug. 2007, at 35, 
38. In addition, single-parent homes, overwhelmingly headed by women, claim a growing 
proportion of American households. In 2012, twenty-eight percent of all American children 
lived with only one parent. JONATHAN VESPA ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA’S 
FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2012, at 23 (2013), https://www.census.gov/prod/ 
2013pubs/p20-570.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GXD-6CES]. 
 119. Notably, this situation applies equally to women and men; most workplaces are 
still dominated by the assumption that employees do not have any outside obligations. 
Thus, although, for example, many men in professional occupations express an ideological 
commitment to an equal division of household labor with their intimate partners, few are 
able to achieve it, except perhaps a very small number of exhausted “superdads.” Marianne 
Cooper, Being the “Go-To Guy”: Fatherhood, Masculinity, and the Organization of Work in 
Silicon Valley, 23 QUALITATIVE SOC. 379, 391 (2000). Gender-nonconforming men who seek 
time-off or other types of accommodations in order to perform family caregiving work are 
often punished just as mothers are. WILLIAMS, supra note 115, at 56-60 (2010); Allen & 
Russell, supra note 112, at 166-68; Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Paternal Leave, 72 TEX. 
L. REV. 1047, 1049 (1994); Michael Selmi, Sex Discrimination in the Nineties, Seventies 
Style: Case Studies in the Preservation of Male Workplace Norms, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y 
J. 1, 3 (2005); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, 
and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 839-44 (2003); Sturm, supra 
note 42, at 459-61.  
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“demand side” theory. Although progress is uneven, this strategy has 
resulted in some positive trends in judicial and policy decisions.120 
 4.   Competing Disciplinary Frameworks 
 These divergent accounts of the reasons for gender-based worker 
inequality can be explained, in part, by the distinct conceptual 
frameworks employed by scholars trained in different disciplines. For 
example, mainstream economics continues, to a certain extent, to 
distinguish between those who engage in productive labor and those 
who do not, with productive labor implicitly defined as goods or 
services exchanged in a market.121 Childrearing, cooking, cleaning, 
and domestic labor more generally are not productive in this view.122 
Mainstream economics’ focus on markets thus excludes, by definition, 
unpaid domestic labor and renders it irrelevant to analyses of the 
workplace.123 Mainstream economics is also more likely to 
conceptualize employees as self-interested individuals who make 
decisions based on the rational pursuit of self-interest. This 
analytical framework tends to confirm supply side theories of gender 
inequity, locating the “problem” of gender-based workplace inequality 
outside the workplace.124  
 In contrast, sociological theories of workplace gender inequality 
emphasize structural forces and cultural influences. Although there 
is no single definition, structural factors are typically understood as a 
                                                                                                                            
 120. Among the successes are the federal Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, a 
2007 EEOC enforcement guidance on Family Responsibilities Discrimination (also known 
as caregiver discrimination), and paid family leave laws in a handful of jurisdictions—
California, Rhode Island, Washington, New Jersey, and New York and the District of 
Columbia. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2611-2619 (2012); 
Paid Family Leave, CAL. UNEMPLOYMENT INS. CODE § 3300 (West 2013); D.C. MUN. REGS. 
tit. 6-B, § 1284 (2017); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 12:21-1.1 (2017); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. 
tit. 12, §§ 355-364 (2017); 42-5 R.I. Code R. § 2:2 (2017); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 296-130-030 
(2017); Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers with  
Caregiving Responsibilities, EEOC (2007), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html 
[https://perma.cc/9XAZ-Y9HG].  
 121. Nancy Folbre, The Unproductive Housewife: Her Evolution in Nineteenth-Century 
Economic Thought, SIGNS, Spring 1991, at 463-69; Joan Williams, Market Work and 
Family Work in the 21st Century, 44 VILL. L. REV. 305, 312, 321 (1999). 
 122. Folbre, supra note 121, at 464-69. 
 123. Id. at 463-66. 
 124. Feminist economists have challenged the assumptions of mainstream economics 
through attention to institutional practices, laws and regulations, and systemic power 
relations. See, e.g., BARBARA R. BERGMANN, THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN 62-86 
(1986); Michelle J. Budig & Paula England, The Wage Penalty for Motherhood, 66 AM. SOC. 
REV. 204, 204-05 (2001); Folbre, supra note 121, at 463-65; Jane Waldfogel, Understanding the 
“Family Gap” in Pay for Women with Children, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 137, 149-53 (1998). 
However, mainstream economics and public policy continue to marginalize these perspectives. 




range of material, objective constraints external to individuals.125 
Cultural theories of work and family conflict examine external 
expectations that shape paid and unpaid work. For example, 
researchers have shown how an intensive parenting culture 
contributes to some women’s decisions to abandon paid employment, 
in addition to other negative effects.126 Similarly, sociologists of work 
have revealed how workplace culture may present a barrier to 
reforms that improve work-life balance. For example, a 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) study found that 
surgical residents actually resisted a reduction of working hours, 
because long hours are a part of their professional identity.127 
 Given the divergent premises and commitments of researchers 
across social science disciplines, the three prevailing understandings 
of gender-based worker inequality—individual employee “supply 
side” factors, gender stereotyping, and the mismatch between the 
structure of work and the needs of employees with family 
responsibilities—are often presented as distinctive, even rival, 
theoretical frameworks. As such, a great deal of social science 
research involves unsatisfying efforts to identify the “real” cause of 
systemic patterns of gender inequality in the workplace or, at best, 
the relative contribution of each. For example, economic research on 
the motherhood wage gap has focused on quantifying the relative 
contribution of supply side human capital factors, such as years of 
work experience, and discrimination by employers.128 Socio-legal 
scholars interested in progressive workplace reform have also 
dedicated significant energy to disproving economic supply side 
theories of workplace gender inequality by emphasizing how 
workplace structures and stereotyping contribute to work and family 
conflict.129 
                                                                                                                            
 125. DAVID RUBINSTEIN, CULTURE, STRUCTURE, AND AGENCY: TOWARD A TRULY 
MULTIDIMENSIONAL SOCIOLOGY 1-6 (2001); Sharon Hays, Structure and Agency and the 
Sticky Problem of Culture, 12 SOC. THEORY 57, 57-72 (1994). 
 126. See Gaia Bernstein & Zvi Triger, Over-Parenting, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221, 1273 
(2011); see also MARY BLAIR-LOY, COMPETING DEVOTIONS: CAREER AND FAMILY AMONG 
WOMEN EXECUTIVES 74-82 (2003); SUSAN J. DOUGLAS & MEREDITH W. MICHAELS, THE 
MOMMY MYTH: THE IDEALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD AND HOW IT HAS UNDERMINED WOMEN 
passim (2004); JUDITH WARNER, PERFECT MADNESS: MOTHERHOOD IN THE AGE OF ANXIETY 
115-21, 140-43 (2005); Gill Valentine, ‘My Son’s a Bit Dizzy.’ ‘My Wife’s a Bit Soft’: Gender, 
Children and Cultures of Parenting, 4 GENDER, PLACE & CULTURE 37, 47-49 (1997). 
 127. See Katherine C. Kellogg et al., Resistance to Change in Surgical Residency: An 
Ethnographic Study of Work Hours Reform, 202 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 630, 633 (2006). 
 128. See Budig & England, supra note 124, at 210-11. 
 129. See Kessler, supra note 44, at 322-30; Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of 
Stereotyping: Using Social Science to Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases and Defang the 
“Clueless” Defense, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 401 passim (2003).  
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B.   Title VII 
 Like a great deal of social science research, Title VII’s major 
theories of liability also, almost uniformly, assume that the three 
prevailing frameworks for understanding gender-based worker 
inequality operate independently of one another.  
 1.   Disparate Treatment 
 Under prevailing Title VII disparate treatment law,130 courts must 
decide sex discrimination claims on the basis of evidence that an 
employer acted because of gender bias or a “legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason” related to the employee’s qualifications or 
work performance.131 In the alternative, under a mixed-motive 
theory, a court can find liability if gender bias was a motivating 
factor.132 Both of these prevailing theories of disparate treatment 
assume that individual employee characteristics, gender bias, and 
workplace structures operate mutually exclusively of one another in 
the workplace. In this sense, the domino effect remains unaddressed 
by disparate treatment law. 
 The disparate treatment case, Warner v. Vance-Cooks,133 
illustrates this failure. Kimberly Warner sued her employer, the 
federal Government Printing Office (GPO), alleging that it had 
discriminated against her on the basis of her sex.134 She was 
represented by the Georgetown University Institute for Public 
Representation,135 a public interest law firm and clinical education 
program founded by Georgetown Law Center.136 Warner began her 
employment with the GPO in 1989 as a payroll technician. She did 
not have a college degree.137 She successfully worked her way up to 
                                                                                                                            
 130. Title VII is the basic federal statute prohibiting discrimination in employment. 
Title VII disparate treatment claims can be brought if an employer treats male and female 
applicants or workers differently. The law has been interpreted to prohibit disparate 
treatment on the basis of sex “plus” a facially neutral characteristic, such as having young 
children. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971). In addition, Title 
VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).  
 131. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Krieger, supra note 41, at 1178. 
 132. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989); Krieger, supra note 41, at 1172. 
 133. 956 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 134. Id. at 136. 
 135. Id.; see also GEO. L. INST. FOR PUB. REPRESENTATION, 2007-2008 ANNUAL REPORT 
6, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/academic-programs/clinical-programs/our-
clinics/IPR/upload/2007-2008ANNUALREPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9CM-LHNZ]. 
 136. See Institute for Public Representation, GEO. L., http://www.law.georgetown.edu/ 
academics/academic-programs/clinical-programs/our-clinics/IPR/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/ 
4PRH-4RAK]. 
 137. Warner, 956 F. Supp. 2d 129, at 137. There is some suggestion that Warner was a 
racial minority, as the court’s decision repeatedly refers to race discrimination. However, her 
complaint did not allege race discrimination and none of her pleadings referenced her race. 




become a graphic processor supervisor, and ultimately, the Chief of 
the GPO’s Digital Print Center (DPC) in 2005.138 In this position, she 
was “in charge of scheduling, assigning work to, training, evaluating, 
and monitoring employees across three shifts” and “serve[d] as the 
selecting official for all vacancies within the DPC.”139 Her job 
required “expert knowledge in highly technical machinery, 
computers, and software applications; GPO and DPC procedures, 
work standards, and workflow; and GPO personnel policies, 
functions, and operations.”140 In 2001, Warner assumed the 
responsibilities as head of the DPC when her former supervisor was 
promoted, but she was not formally promoted into his vacant 
position.141 She filed an EEOC complaint alleging that she was being 
paid significantly less than the supervisor she replaced.142 As a result 
of this complaint, Warner received a formal promotion and pay 
increase in 2005 and a lump sum monetary settlement in 2007.143 
 Subsequently, Warner applied for seven positions at a higher pay 
grade. The GPO placed her on the “best qualified list” for each 
position; however, management invited her to interview for only one 
of the positions and hired men for all but one.144 She eventually sued 
for not being promoted to one of these positions. The man who 
received the position had been given the opportunity to fill-in 
temporarily in the job for three months, allowing him to gain relevant 
experience in the position and thereby demonstrate his qualifications 
before he was selected over Warner for the promotion.145 
 In addition to differential opportunities to be groomed for 
advancement, Warner alleged a number of retaliatory and 
discriminatory conditions. A very loud binding machine unrelated to 
the work of her department was placed in her work area without her 
input.146 The noise created obstacles to her performing her work, 
which involved dealing with customers and vendors over the 
telephone and serving walk-up customers.147 She was denied a 
private office, despite multiple requests. Dealing with confidential 
                                                                                                                            
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 138. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See Complaint at 2, Warner, 956 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 1:10-cv-
01306), ECF No. 1. 
 142. Warner, 956 F. Supp. 2d 129, at 138. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 141. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Opposition to Defendant’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Warner, 956 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 1:10-cv-
01306), ECF No. 24-1, at 36-37. 
 147. Warner, 956 F. Supp. 2d 129, at 142. 
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supervisory matters was also difficult given the public location of her 
workspace.148 All of the other supervisors in the DPC, who were men, 
had private offices,149 as did many assistant supervisors below her.150 
Her budget was cut, and the resulting understaffing required her to 
undertake non-supervisory printing responsibilities.151 Warner was 
denied cross-training opportunities, despite repeated requests.152 
 She asserted that she was given the title of supervisor but was not 
treated as one.153 For example, male subordinates without experience 
were assigned to take over her duties, undermining her authority.154 
She was left out of meetings where important decisions were made,155 
such as the closure of one of the DPC’s offices and the termination of 
an employee she supervised.156 On one occasion, when she did attend 
a management meeting, another manager engaged in a tirade 
against Warner.157 Subsequent to this incident of verbal abuse, 
Warner stopped attending management meetings altogether, because 
she did not feel comfortable.158 
 The GPO used a performance-based evaluation system.159 Warner 
had consistently received the highest possible ratings on her 
evaluations before she settled her EEOC pay complaint in 2007.160 
Subsequently, she received her lowest ratings of her near twenty-
year DPC career.161 Although her performance evaluations were still 
very good, she never received the highest possible rating again.162 
Warner argued that all of the conditions, as a whole, combined with 
the biased performance ratings, constituted retaliation for her EEOC 
complaint and discrimination on the basis of sex.163 She alleged that 
the discrimination caused her to lose sleep and suffer from 
depression, and that for almost a year, she was not able to get out of 
                                                                                                                            
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Opposition to Defendant’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 146, at 37. 
 151. Warner, 956 F. Supp. 2d at 143. 
 152. Id. at 145. 
 153. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Opposition to Defendant’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 146, ECF No. 24-2, at 2-4. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Warner, 956 F. Supp. 2d at 145-46. 
 156. Id. at 146. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 143-44. 
 160. Id. at 139. 
 161. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Opposition to Defendant’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 146, ECF No. 24, at 10 & ECF No. 24-1, at 10. 
 162. Warner, 956 F. Supp. 2d at 143-45. 
 163. Id. at 147-48. 




bed when not at work, which diminished her ability as a single 
parent to care for her teenage son.164 
 Warner also introduced two other types of evidence: direct 
evidence of sex discrimination and statistical evidence. Specifically, 
she presented evidence that the person who made the decision to 
promote a man rather than Warner had once told her she would just 
have to “suck it up because that’s how it is with women in the plant”; 
and that she “would have to work extra hard [to get ahead] and deal 
with it.”165 She also introduced statistical evidence demonstrating a 
classic glass-ceiling pattern of sex discrimination, with only twelve 
percent of the GPO’s top management consisting of women, despite 
the fact that more than half of the GPO’s overall professional 
workforce was female.166 
 Despite this mountain of evidence demonstrating sex 
discrimination and retaliation, the district court granted summary 
judgment on both claims in favor of the GPO.167 In doing so, it 
reasoned that the man who received the promotion rather than 
Warner was more qualified, because he had more years of experience 
and exposure in more departments.168 In making this assessment, the 
court dismissed Warner’s evidence of irregularities in the GPO’s 
decisionmaking process, as well as the fact that the successful 
candidate was rated just a few points more than Warner in a 
mathematical scoring system for the position. It also neglected to 
acknowledge that the GPO’s own decision to groom the successful 
candidate for a promotion, deny her cross-training opportunities,169 
and shut out Warner from leadership contributed to his higher score. 
The court also diminished all of Warner’s other evidence. It reasoned 
that the “suck it up” comment was a stray remark unrelated to the 
decisional process not to promote her;170 that the statistical evidence 
was not probative of discrimination, because it did not include an 
                                                                                                                            
 164. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion 
for Summary Judgment, supra note 146, ECF No. 24, at 10 & ECF No. 24-1, at 55-63. 
 165. Warner, 956 F. Supp. 2d at 156; see also Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points & Au-
thorities in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 146, ECF 
No. 24, at 10 & ECF No. 24-1, at 10-11. 
 166. Warner, 956 F. Supp. 2d at 138. 
 167. Id. at 137. 
 168. Id. at 153-54. 
 169. Vicki Schultz’s observations on the matter of differential training, articulated 
almost twenty years ago, are as pertinent as ever. She explained, “In nontraditional blue-
collar occupations, virtually all training is acquired informally on the job. Thus, a woman's 
ability to succeed depends on the willingness of her supervisors and coworkers to teach her 
the relevant skills. Yet women’s stories of being denied proper training are legion.” See 
Schultz, supra note 73, at 1835. 
 170. Warner, 956 F. Supp. 2d at 155-56. 
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analysis of applicant flow data;171 that the allegedly biased 
performance evaluations did not constitute adverse employment 
actions, because they were still very good;172 and that Warner’s other 
evidence, such as her exclusion from important meetings and 
committees and lack of an office, were minor annoyances that did not 
amount to an adverse employment action.173 The court concluded its 
opinion by observing that Warner was a “dissatisfied, frustrated and 
unhappy” employee “for years,”174 language suggesting that the court 
saw no relation between the discrimination Warner endured and its 
impact on her. 
 This type of judicial response to a quite representative individual 
disparate treatment case illustrates the inadequacy of Title VII as 
presently conceptualized to address the domino effect. The court 
disaggregated the evidence into a series of seemingly isolated and 
trivial incidents and neglected to consider how the plaintiff’s 
behaviors, such as absenting herself from meetings and filing 
grievances, represented rational and legitimate responses to the 
pervasive pattern of sex discrimination. It also failed to credit how 
the many forms of discrimination she suffered negatively affected her 
qualifications, which then ultimately became the justification for the 
decision not to promote her.  
 Inequality often results from the amalgamation of a series of 
discriminatory acts that combine to result in substantial inequalities. 
Moreover, discrimination and biased evaluation often impede 
employees’ ability to succeed at work, both by hindering employees’ 
ability to perform their jobs and by signaling that little investment 
should be made in protected employees’ successes. Further, in the 
face of discrimination, employees often engage in compensatory 
behaviors, such as avoidance, which may make them appear 
uncommitted or compromise their ability to do their jobs. 
Discrimination may also have adverse mental or physical health 
effects, which further diminish employee performance. As the 
Warner case illustrates, these dynamics do not occur at one 
particular moment or in a straight line. Rather, discrimination often 
results from a chain of events that build and combine in ways that 
cause significant inequality, through a process of social interaction 
and reinforcement. If the process of employment discrimination were 
to be represented graphically, it would be a circle, not a line.  
Title VII disparate treatment doctrine, as presently conceptualized, 
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is unable to provide a remedy for this common social process of 
discriminatory exclusion. 
 2.   Systemic Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact 
 Although disparate treatment is the main focus of this Article, it 
is worth noting that the systemic disparate treatment175 and 
disparate impact176 theories of discrimination under Title VII, while 
better able to capture the ways that systemic bias and discriminatory 
workplace structures may perpetuate inequality for employees, also 
generally fail to account for the dynamic interdependent nature of 
individual employee “choices,” discriminatory bias, and workplace 
structures. 
 For example, disparate impact has been used with relatively 
limited success in challenging structural features of workplaces that 
exacerbate gender-based inequality, such as long or inflexible work 
hours, limited sick or personal leave, extended probationary periods, 
layoff policies that disfavor part-time employees, travel 
requirements,177 and restrictive light-duty policies.178 More generally, 
the Supreme Court’s disparate impact decisions have gradually 
increased the plaintiff's burden of proof in disparate impact cases; 
neutrality of impact is now measured according to the specific 
employment criteria, rather than the broader discernable impact on 
the employer’s workforce. Under this standard, plaintiffs must isolate 
and identify each discriminatory practice and its mechanism of 
action; plaintiffs cannot just identify the consequences in the form of 
statistical disparities in an employer’s workforce and expect the 
                                                                                                                            
 175. The Title VII systemic disparate treatment theory is used in cases where a 
widespread pattern or practice of intentional discrimination is proved using statistical evidence 
in addition to other types of evidence, such as anecdotal evidence of individual instances of 
discrimination. See, e.g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977). 
 176. The Title VII disparate impact theory is used in cases where practices or policies 
that appear to be gender neutral actually have a negative impact on workers of one sex. In 
a disparate impact case, a plaintiff need not prove that the employer acted with discrimi-
natory purpose or intent. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). 
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff need only show that appar-
ently neutral selection criteria operated to exclude protected class members at a dispropor-
tionate rate. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989). The employer 
bears the burden of justifying the challenged criteria. The employer’s burden is merely one 
of “producing evidence of a business justification for his employment practice[s].” Wards 
Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S. at 659 (1989). 
 177. See Kessler, supra note 52, at 414-15. 
 178. See Widiss, supra note 51, at 1020-21 (noting that pregnant employees who have 
challenged restrictive light-duty policies under the disparate impact theory have often been 
unsuccessful). 
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employer to explain the practice on business grounds.179 Moreover, 
plaintiffs can no longer rely on the proportion of minorities in the 
general population as a baseline for measuring disparate impact. 
Instead, plaintiffs must calculate the racial composition of “the 
qualified . . . population in the relevant labor market.”180 Both of 
these limitations essentially erase the structural aspects of 
employment discrimination by disaggregating into isolated events 
systemic employment practices that produce inequality.181 More 
generally, a majority of the Supreme Court has signaled its general 
hostility to the disparate impact theory across contexts.182  
 Additionally, under both the systemic disparate treatment183 and 
disparate impact184 frameworks, courts have allowed employers to 
avoid liability for discrimination by arguing that employees protected 
by Title VII lack interest in highly rewarded jobs.185 In doing so, 
courts have failed to recognize the role of workplace structures and 
                                                                                                                            
 179. Wards Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S. at 657; Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 
U.S. 977, 994 (1988) (plurality opinion). 
 180. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977). 
 181. See, e.g., Vitug v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 88 F.3d 506, 515-16 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that word-of-mouth recruitment practices resulting in the disproportionate failure 
to hire Asian or Catholic applicants did not demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion, because the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that any particular employment 
qualification produced a statistical disparity); cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 
338, 352 (2011) (holding that statistical evidence of gender disparities combined with a 
sociologist’s analysis that Wal-Mart’s corporate culture made it vulnerable to gender bias 
were inadequate to show that members of the putative class had a common claim for pur-
poses of class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)). 
 182. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. 
Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015) (disallowing disparate impact claims where a plaintiff cannot estab-
lish a “robust” causal link to a defendant’s actual policies serves to eliminate suits seeking 
to hold a defendant liable for alleged racial disparities it “did not create.”); cf. Ricci v. 
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 579-80 (2009) (holding that the City of New Haven’s decision to 
invalidate the results of a promotional exam for firefighters in order to avoid disparate 
impact of the test on black and Hispanic candidates constituted illegal disparate treatment 
in violation of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause, because the City had considered 
the racial impact of the test in abandoning the results). 
 183. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 
 184. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S. at 647, 653-54 (holding that in a 
racially-segregated Alaska salmon cannery, the cannery workforce of mostly Filipinos and 
Alaska Natives was not the relevant labor market for better-paid, unskilled non-cannery 
jobs, because the cannery workers did not seek these positions, despite evidence that the 
employer relied on racially segregated hiring channels, operated segregated housing and 
dining facilities, and used a number of other employment practices, such as adopting a 
rehiring preference and not promoting from within, that could explain its segregated 
workforce at the plant). But see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977) (rejecting a 
state’s argument that disparate impact should only be assessed with regard to women who 
actually applied for prison guard jobs and that a weight and height requirement for such 
jobs did not have a disparate impact on the women who actually applied). 
 185. Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical 
Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1080-81 (1992). 




gender and race bias in shaping applicants and employees’ career 
aspirations. More recently, the Supreme Court made it more difficult 
to certify class actions under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure,186 a crucial tool for large-scale litigation seeking structural 
reform of the workplace, and in doing so, implicitly rejected the 
systemic disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of 
employer liability under Title VII.187 Although these more expansive 
theories of employer liability represent an improvement on the 
individual disparate treatment framework in their recognition that 
discrimination in the workplace is connected to larger social patterns, 
neither doctrine, as presently constituted, provides an adequate 
account of how workplaces themselves participate in social patterns 
of discrimination and shape the employees subject to them.188  
IV.   DISCOVERING THE DOMINO EFFECT:  
ITS INTELLECTUAL AND EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS 
 The imperative of lawyers to fit their clients’ facts into existing 
doctrinal forms, as well as the natural pull of divergent disciplinary 
perspectives on discrimination, have had unfortunate intellectual 
consequences. Although few contributors to the fields of employment 
discrimination or inequality in the labor market personally subscribe 
to the undertheorized conception of inequality described in Part III, 
much of the research, public-policy advocacy, and legal doctrine in 
this area emphasizes the mutually exclusive nature of these theories.  
 An alternative social scientific perspective, considered in this Part, 
examines interactions among the three potential understandings of 
worker inequality. I discuss some of this research, which demonstrates 
                                                                                                                            
 186. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 359 (2011). In Wal-Mart, the Court 
narrowed the availability of class actions by its interpretation of Rule 23 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Rule 23(a)(2) requires a party seeking class 
certification to prove that there are “questions of law or fact common to the class.” FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23(a)(2). To satisfy Rule 23(a)(2), the lawsuit must resolve an issue that all the class 
members share. In Wal-Mart, the issue underlying the claims of all members of the class 
was whether Wal-Mart’s policy of granting local store managers complete and final discre-
tion over pay and promotion decisions constituted a common discriminatory practice mak-
ing all women employees vulnerable to sex discrimination. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 342. The 
Court held that there was no common question of “law or fact,” as the statistical evidence 
in the record showing pay and promotion disparities between male and female Wal-Mart 
employees was insufficient to demonstrate a general corporate policy of allowing discrimi-
nation. Id. at 355. As a result, the class could not be certified because it could not meet the 
requirements of Rule 23(a). 
 187. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 355. 
 188. See Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 
2479, 2526 (1994) (“The reluctance of courts — across the range of Title VII doctrines — to 
make explicit the ways that systems of discrimination operate and intersect, or shape the 
consciousness of the subject, has created a doctrine that is blind to many discriminatory 
dynamics.”). 
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two dynamics relevant to this analysis. First, organizational 
arrangements can activate or suppress bias. As such, discriminatory 
workplace structures and stereotyping by decisionmakers are not 
independent phenomena; rather, there is an interaction between the 
two that can amplify or reduce discrimination and worker inequality. 
Second, as should not be any surprise, employees who are subject to 
bias are not immune from its affects. They may respond in ways 
consistent with stereotypical expectations, or they may work to 
overcome the stereotype by engaging in energy-expending behaviors 
and strategies to counteract biased expectations. Either way, these 
responses often produce real costs for the employee, for example, in the 
form of lowered job productivity, diminished performance, or 
dampened aspirations. Thus, taking account of these dynamics, 
discriminatory bias and personal explanations for worker inequality—
such as individual employees’ characteristics, motivation, 
performance, and personal “choices” (that is, factors disparate 
treatment law classifies as belonging on the supply side of things)—are 
also not independent of one another. As a whole, the research 
discussed in this Part demonstrates the domino model of workplace 
inequality, and it suggests that employers are substantially more 
complicit in creating inequality than our current law assumes. Indeed, 
work organizations can be veritable inequality factories under certain 
conditions. 
A.   New Institutionalism 
 New institutionalism is a theory that focuses on developing a 
sociological view of institutions. New institutionalism cannot be 
simply defined—it has flourished in many disciplines including 
sociology, economics, political science, business organization theory, 
and history. As two key founders of this intellectual movement 
explain, “approaches to institutions rooted in such different soils 
cannot be expected to converge on a single set of assumptions and 
goals,”189 but it is fair to say that the common thread is a “skepticism 
toward atomistic accounts of social processes” and institutional 
arrangements.190 
 One sub-genre of this research studies how inequality is produced 
inside institutions and, in particular, how personnel practices in 
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work organizations shape employee preferences and behaviors.191 
This research suggests that gendered work patterns, such as the 
glass ceiling and sex-segregation, are traceable to the influence of 
organizational structures on employees’ aspirations and behavior. 
That is, work preferences and commitments evolve in the context of 
the workplace environment and develop as a result of opportunities 
and experiences. As legal scholar Vicki Schultz has noted, “these 
observations seem astonishingly simple. It seems obvious that 
socialization does not grind to a halt when young women emerge 
from childhood, but continues behind the office door or factory gate to 
influence their attitudes and aspirations as adult workers.”192 As 
sociologist Rosabeth Moss Kanter explained in her classic account of 
how organizations affect employee’s performance: 
[T]o a very large degree, organizations make their workers into 
who they are. Adults change to fit the system. . . . [O]rganizations 
often act as though it is possible to predict people’s job futures 
from the characteristics they bring with them [to] a recruiting 
interview. What really happens is that predictions get made on the 
basis of stereotypes and current notions of who fits where in the 
present system; people are then “set up” in positions which make 
the predictions come true.193 
 This theory should not be understood to assume that individuals 
are automatons without agency. It is simply a recognition that people 
act strategically within the constraints of their positions in an 
organization. This insight is consistent with a significant body of 
feminist scholarship challenging liberal conceptions of autonomy. For 
example, feminist theorists have offered a number of insights about 
how women’s choices are made under conditions of constraint that 
may affect choices in a wide range of arenas, including decisions 
about where to work, walk, and whether and how to speak.194 
B.   Stereotype Threat and the Self-Fulfilling Prophesy 
 Social psychologists have demonstrated how the situational threat 
of being judged or treated stereotypically can affect the members of a 
group about whom a negative stereotype exists, adversely affecting 
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 192. Id. at 1824. 
 193. ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 263 (1977).  
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performance and hampering achievement.195 When individuals feel 
that a sociocultural group to which they belong is negatively 
stereotyped in that domain, performance can be hindered. Thus, for 
example, in Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson’s seminal 
experiments on stereotype threat, African-American students, who 
are stereotyped to be poor students, underperformed relative to white 
students when they were told that a test was diagnostic of how smart 
they are.196 In the experiment, the investigators gave a difficult 
verbal test to white and black college students. One group was told 
that the test measured how smart they were. Another comparable 
group was told that the same test was just a laboratory exercise. The 
black students performed as well as the white students when they 
were told the test was a general lab exercise, controlling for the 
participants’ skills. In contrast, when told that the test was 
measuring their intelligence, the black students greatly 
underperformed equally skilled white students.197 
 The stereotype threat results have been replicated in experiments 
involving other identities. For example, in a more recent study, 
Asian-American women at Harvard University were asked to take a 
hard math test. Those given a questionnaire before the test with 
innocuous questions designed to prime their Asian identities 
performed best, those given a questionnaire with no identity primed 
came in second, and the group that had its female identity primed 
ranked last (forty-three percent) on the test.198 These findings were 
replicated by Steele and his team at the University of Michigan. 
Women and men undergraduates with entering math SAT scores in 
the top fifteen percent of the Michigan student population and who 
identified math as “very important to their personal and career 
goals” were given a difficult math test.199 The female students 
performed just as well as the male students when the test was 
presented as one that did not show sex differences, that is, as a test 
in which women always did as well as men,200 but they performed 
significantly worse than the male students when they did not receive 
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this instruction.201 Along the same lines, elderly people perform worse 
on a memory task if they are primed before the task with a negative 
stereotype of the elderly than if they are primed with a positive 
stereotype of the elderly.202 Even typically privileged groups can be 
made to experience stereotype threat. For example, a study found 
that white men performed more poorly on a math test when they 
were told that their performance would be compared with that of 
Asian-American men,203 and another found that whites performed 
more poorly than African Americans on a motor task when it was 
described to them as measuring their natural athletic ability.204 
These studies and others explaining a wide range of performance 
disparities demonstrate the powerful influence of stereotypes on 
individual performance,205 even when subtly activated.206  
 What explains the stereotype threat effects found in these studies? 
The primary mechanism is likely related to stress. One very 
comprehensive review posits that activating negative stereotypes 
about a person’s identity creates physiological stress, which directly 
impairs the ability to process information and causes the person to 
divert mental energy to monitoring performance and suppressing 
negative thoughts and emotions.207 These mechanisms combine to 
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consume mental resources needed to perform well on cognitive and 
social tasks. 
 A related and fascinating phenomenon studied by social 
psychologists is called the “self-fulfilling prophecy”208 or “behavioral 
confirmation.”209 Behavioral confirmation occurs when stereotyping 
or bias by a perceiver influences the perceiver’s treatment of a target, 
which, in turn, shapes the target’s behavior in a manner consistent 
with the perceiver’s expectancy.210 As explained by Robert Merton, 
the Columbia University sociologist who developed the classic 
definition of this theory, “[t]he self-fulling prophecy is, in the 
beginning, a false definition of the situation evoking a new behavior 
which makes the originally false conception come true.”211 For 
example, a person who holds a stereotype that black people are 
hostile may behave cautiously and distrusting around a black 
colleague, in accordance with her belief, and thereby evoke cold and 
distant behavior from the colleague, confirming the stereotype.212 
According to social psychologist Susan Fiske, “[b]eing able to make 
the stereotype true can be convenient for the perceiver because it 
makes the target predictable and potentially more controllable.”213 
The behavioral confirmation then becomes the justification for future 
treatment consistent with the originally false belief. In Merton’s 
words, “The specious validity of the self-fulfilling prophecy 
perpetuates a reign of error. For the prophet will cite the actual 
course of events as proof that he was right from the very 
beginning.”214 
 A number of controlled experiments illustrate the behavioral 
confirmation phenomenon. When an African-American job candidate 
is treated with great distance and abruptness, he flounders in an 
interview.215 A child whose playmate believes she is younger chooses 
easier games than a child labeled as older.216 The apparent reason is 
that when one child believes her playmate is younger, she treats the 
playmate as if she is a younger person, behaving in a more directive 
and assertive manner, eliciting a response from the playmate that is 
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consistent with the play of a younger child.217 In an experiment 
simulating police interrogations, mock crime suspects whose 
interrogators are led to believe they are guilty are more likely to be 
subject to aggressive interrogation techniques, which in turn evokes 
more defensive responses by the suspects and leads judges naïve of 
the experiment conditions to perceive the suspect as more guilty than 
suspects whose interrogators believe they are innocent.218 In 
simulated job interviews, applicants given the benefit of positive 
expectations present more positive and less negative information 
about themselves compared with applicants confronting interviewers 
holding negative expectations,219 and female applicants whose male 
interviewers are led to believe the female applicants are attracted to 
them demonstrate significantly more flirtatious behavior than female 
applicants whose interviewers do not hold this belief.220 
 With repeated exposure, the expectancy of being stereotyped can 
become internalized and thus self-maintaining. As explained by 
social psychologists Theresa Claire and Susan Fiske: 
This is particularly true for certain categories of targets, often those 
who are easily identified by noticeable physical characteristics. For 
example, in this society, being African American, physically 
disabled, or elderly often functions as a “master status” category. 
Although the person belongs to other categories, perceivers from 
majority groups accord extreme importance to this one salient 
feature, and it influences both interpretations of the target’s 
behavior and behavior toward the target. Thus, stereotypes  
are . . . pervasively applied in interactions with targets.  
 From the target’s perspective, the pervasiveness of perceiver 
stereotypes about one’s group means increased pressure to confirm 
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stereotypes because of the sheer number of times the target must 
face the stereotypic conception.221  
Thus, the targets of stereotyping may repeat behavior elicited 
previously,222 “thereby making the stereotype ultimately, although 
not initially, ‘true.’ ”223 
 In sum, when individuals hold expectations about other people (as 
targets), they can elicit from these targets behaviors that are 
consistent with their expectations, even if these expectations are 
independent of the target’s preexisting characteristics. Research 
suggests that behavioral confirmation is most likely to occur when a 
perceiver has power over a dependent target,224 as is the case when 
employers have power over job applicants or employees, making the 
behavioral confirmation phenomenon particularly relevant to the 
employment context. 
 Much of the research discovering the phenomenon of behavioral 
confirmation is derived from controlled laboratory experiments. Of 
course, work organizations are much more complex than the lab 
setting, and behavioral confirmation sometimes occurs in ways 
unanticipated by those who first advanced this sociological theory. 
For example, targets who are aware of being stereotyped may 
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respond in ways that are incongruent with a perceiver’s stereotype to 
counter erroneous and undesirable expectations,225 which has its own 
costs and risks. However, hundreds of experimental studies over 
several decades suggest that behavioral confirmation is a real 
phenomenon that occurs in many domains.226 
 Field studies of the classroom, the workplace, and the military 
correlate these findings outside the laboratory. For example, studies 
have revealed that teachers’ low expectations of students depress 
academic performance, and that this effect is larger for students who 
are low in power and advantage.227 Along the same lines, middle-
schoolers whose peers have negative expectations of them become 
increasingly submissive with friends over time,228 as any parent of a 
bullied or ostracized child could anecdotally verify. A recent meta-
analysis found that managers’ expectations have a self-fulfilling 
effect, with higher expectations leading to higher employee 
performance.229 Military trainees of whom instructors expect the least 
perform the worst.230 In contrast, high expectations from military 
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commanders leads to increases in performance of cadets who are the 
subject of these beliefs.231 These studies provide further support for 
the claim that expectations of individuals can have dramatic effects 
on their performance and that this phenomenon is likely to operate 
the same way in work organizations as in the lab. 
C.   Salience 
 Salience is another helpful concept for understanding the domino 
effect in the employment context. According to social scientists, 
anything that focuses observers’ attention on a stereotyped category 
is said to “prime” stereotyping, and this process occurs even without 
the observer’s awareness.232 Employee behaviors or characteristics 
associated with their minority status can trigger stereotyping by 
others. For example, becoming pregnant, taking a family leave, or 
simply having children tend to make an employee’s gender more 
salient in the workplace, especially women’s.233 Wearing braids in the 
workplace may make an African American’s race more salient, 
creating a higher likelihood that she will be subject to negative 
evaluation.234 In the context of the classroom, the concept of salience 
explains why minority and women professors are more likely to be 
negatively evaluated as politically biased by students when they 
teach subjects that address identity and inequality.235 Organizational 
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contexts can also make category membership salient. For example, 
studies show that a highly skewed sex or race composition in a work 
group is likely to activate stereotypes.236 Similarly, studies show that 
being a token—the only African American, gay person, one of only a 
few women, etc.—is likely to activate bias.237 
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U.S. at 95. Costa was responsible, along with other members of her union bargaining unit, 
for operating the forklifts and pallet jacks to retrieve food and beverage orders. Costa, 299 
F.3d at 844. During her tenure, she was constantly written up for minor infractions that, 
when committed by male employees, were overlooked or even rewarded. For example, 
when she came in late for work—on one occasion, even just a minute—she received a writ-
ten reprimand, but when male employees were late or missed work, their tardiness was 
disregarded or they were given overtime to make up for lost wages. Id. at 845. Costa 
was regularly assigned less overtime than males, because they “ha[d] . . . famil[y] to sup-
port.” Id. Caesars management singled her out for harsher discipline; for example, she was 
frequently warned and even suspended for allegedly hazardous use of equipment and for 
use of profanity, yet men engaged in this conduct “with impunity.” Id. Costa also suffered 
from sex-based verbal and physical abuse. For example, a female supervisor referred to her 
as a “bitch,” and a coworker called her a “fucking cunt.” Id. at 846. One male supervisor 
followed her around the warehouse, subjecting her to intense scrutiny, described by three 
witnesses as “intense ‘stalking.’ ” Id. at 845. The situation came to a head when a male 
coworker trapped her in an elevator and shoved her into a wall. Id. at 846. Costa was fired 
for fighting, given her disciplinary history, while her male coworker, who had a relatively 
clean disciplinary record, was merely suspended for five days. Id. 
 According to the Ninth Circuit, “Costa’s work was characterized as ‘excellent’ and 
‘good.’ As her supervisor explained: ‘We knew when she was out there the job would get 
done.’ ” Id. at 844. Yet, social psychological research suggests this may be why she was 
targeted. Women in traditionally male occupations may face hostility, because they are 
viewed as inappropriately masculine. Researchers describe this as an “agency penalty.” 
See, e.g., Alice H. Eagly & Steven J. Karau, Role Congruity Theory of Prejudice Toward 
Female Leaders, 109 PSYCHOL. REV. 573, 585 (2002). Moreover, when women perform well 
 
58  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:3  
 
 
D.   Working Identity 
 Building on these frameworks, as well as sociologist Erving 
Goffman’s influential work on the formation of identity through 
social encounters in everyday life,238 critical legal scholars have 
                                                                                                                            
in traditionally male jobs, they do so at the cost of being seen as “competent but cold,” see 
Amy J.C. Cuddy et al., The Dynamics of Warmth and Competence Judgments, and Their 
Outcomes in Organizations, 31 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 73, 85-86 (2011), and they 
may experience negative reactions in the form of social and economic sanctions, an effect 
known as “stereotype backlash.” See Laurie A. Rudman & Julie E. Phelan, Backlash Effects 
for Disconfirming Gender Stereotypes in Organizations, 28 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 
61, 67 (2008). Furthermore, studies suggest that when women convey anger at work, they 
are conferred lower status and salary than men who express anger and lower status and 
salary than women who do not express anger. See Victoria L. Brescoll & Eric Luis 
Uhlmann, Can Angry Women Get Ahead? Status Conferral, Gender, and Expressions of 
Emotion in the Workplace, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 268, 273 (2008). Indeed, men who express 
anger at work may benefit from a heightened status. Id.  
 Costa’s solo status as the only woman in an otherwise all-male unit likely triggered 
and exacerbated these discriminatory processes by making her sex more salient and a cue 
to judgment. This could partly explain why, for example, Costa’s tardiness and foul lan-
guage would be noticed, but not male employees’. That Costa displayed some of the behav-
iors her male-coworkers expected of her also suggests behavioral confirmation. The record 
showed that management and warehouse coworkers thought of and treated Costa as a 
“bitch.” In response to the bullying and ostracization, Costa may have felt isolated and 
unhappy and responded in kind by sometimes behaving in an ill-tempered manner. Moreo-
ver, losing one’s temper, fighting, and cursing were routine behaviors in the warehouse, 
and witness testimony suggested that she “got along with most people” and had “few ar-
guments.” Costa, 299 F.3d at 845. The studies discussed above suggest that these displays 
of anger would have hurt Costa but would have been inconsequential or even respected 
when men lost their tempers in the warehouse. Ultimately, Caesar’s Palace attributed 
Costa’s termination to her inability to get along with others, and Costa conceded that she 
was “not . . . a model employee,” litigating her claim under the mixed-motive theory of 
proof. Id. at 846. Costa won at trial, and the judgment was ultimately affirmed on appeal. 
The Supreme Court held that, contrary to the Caesars’ position, the usual civil litigation 
standard of the preponderance of the evidence applies in mixed-motive cases, and there-
fore, it was not a reversible error for the trial court to give a mixed-motive jury instruction 
even though Costa did not introduce direct evidence of discrimination. Desert Palace, 539 
U.S. at 101. Still, when viewed through the lens of social psychological research on role 
incongruity, stereotype backlash, salience, the agency and anger penalty, and behavioral 
confirmation, the case should not have been conceptualized as a mixed-motive case in the 
first instance. The pattern of sex-based discriminatory treatment was egregious. Caesars 
condoned the discrimination by ignoring Costa’s complaints or even disciplining her for 
complaining. Costa, 299 F.3d at 845-46. Costa’s reaction to this toxic environment, assum-
ing there was some truth to Caesar’s assertions about Costa’s social skills, was consistent 
with social psychological understandings of how individuals respond to discrimination. 
Caesars’ asserted “legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons” for firing Costa—that she was 
not a team player and had a long disciplinary record—are most accurately understood as 
the product of discrimination, rather than a justification for it. 
 238. See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 
(1959). Goffman (1922-1982) was a Canadian-American sociologist working within the 
sociological field of symbolic interactionism, which looks at everyday behavior and 
interactions between people to help explain society. Some examples of everyday interaction 
would be meeting people in a grocery store, workers interacting on the job, or children 
playing in a park. Within this field, Goffman introduced a vocabulary normally associated 
 




documented how exclusionary institutional cultures and stereotypes 
may interact to produce specific negative effects for individuals 
belonging to outsider groups. For example, Devon Carbado and Mitu 
Gulati have developed the concept of “identity work” to describe the 
compensatory behaviors that outsider groups may engage in to avoid 
negative stereotypes in the workplace.239 According to this 
perspective, institutional characteristics, such as the “up or out” 
promotion tracks and “good citizen” cultures of law firms and law 
school faculties, may interact with group-specific stereotypes so as to 
influence the kinds of choices employees make in negotiating their 
identity.240 For example, an Asian employee at risk of being 
stereotyped as submissive, nonthreatening, and detail oriented—
good worker-bee qualities but not generally rainmaker/partner 
qualities—may choose to do extra identity work such as going out 
drinking with colleagues, attending workplace-related social events, 
or participating on sports teams with others at work.241 A lesbian 
employee, in fear of workplace harassment or discrimination, may 
decide to remain in the closet at work.242 Alternatively, a member of a 
minority group may engage in “comforting” behaviors aimed at 
making insiders comfortable about an employee’s minority status, 
such as denigrating members of her own minority group.243 
                                                                                                                            
with the world of theater based on his theory that “life itself is a dramatically enacted 
thing.” Id. at 72. To this end, he developed a “dramaturgical approach” to understanding 
human interaction, id. at xi, which asserts that a person’s identity is not a stable and 
independent psychological entity, but rather, is shaped as the person interacts with others, 
id. at 252-53. Goffman’s work suggests that humans are pragmatic actors who continually 
adjust their performance in response to often unspoken and taken-for-granted subtleties 
that shape social interaction. Moreover, according to Goffman, these performances tend to 
become institutionalized as performances conducted in similar settings and by similar 
actors give rise to “stereotyped expectations” that transcend the particular interaction and 
setting. Id. at 27. Goffman’s theory is useful to researchers who study prejudice, bias, 
stereotyping, and discrimination, because it provides an account of how the disadvantaged 
position of disfavored minorities is produced and maintained in institutional domains such 
as schools and workplaces. 
 239. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 
1262 (2000). A fuller treatment of their theory can be found in ACTING WHITE? RETHINKING 
RACE IN POST-RACIAL AMERICA. See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 43. 
 240. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 239, at 1273-76. 
 241. Id. at 1263-66. 
 242. Id. at 1277. 
 243. Id. at 1301-03. Along the same lines, Joan Williams describes the comforting be-
haviors or roles that women must often engage in so as not to threaten men. She explains: 
“In everyday interaction, women are more commonly stereotyped at the level of 
subtypes, as ‘housewives’ or ‘career women,’ ‘babes’ or ‘lesbians.’ ” In environ-
ments where women experience bias, particularly those where women are out-
numbered, sometimes women can succeed only by stepping into one of various 
roles reassuring to men, including the mother, a nurturing consoler who han-
dles the emotion work of a group; the princess, who pairs with a male protector; 
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 Kenji Yoshino offers a similar concept in his theory of “covering,” 
whereby a minority group is permitted to retain and articulate its 
identity as long as it mutes the difference between itself and the 
mainstream.244 Covering demands are at issue, for example, when an 
employer hires gays, but not a lesbian who “flaunts” her 
homosexuality by formalizing her relationship through marriage245 or 
when African-American women are pressured to straighten their 
hair.246  
 As these critiques highlight, “identity work” often comes with 
costs and risks, including compromising one’s sense of self, the risk 
that others will identify the performative element of an outsider’s 
behavior as strategic and manipulative, and the risk of triggering yet 
other negative stereotypes.247 Moreover, as legal scholar Gowri 
Ramachandran has argued, when a person’s identity lies at the 
intersection of more than one low-status category, conformity 
demands may be especially acute and costly.248 For example, a black 
                                                                                                                            
the pet, “a group mascot who applauds male achievements and gains ac-
ceptance by being a cute little person”; or Ms. Efficiency, a glorified secretary 
who organizes the group and keeps things on track. 
See Williams, supra note 129, at 419-20 (footnotes omitted). 
 244. YOSHINO, supra note 43, passim. 
 245. Cf. id. at 93-101 (recounting the story of Robin Shahar, whose offer of employment 
as a staff attorney in Georgia’s Attorney General Office was rescinded after she informed 
the state on a routine personnel form of her plans to hold a commitment ceremony with her 
partner, Francine Greenfield). Shahar lost a freedom of intimate association suit based on 
these facts. See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F. 3d 1097, 1110-11 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 
 246. See generally Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection 
of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365; Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: 
Exploring New Strands of Analysis Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079 (2010); Ashleigh 
Shelby Rosette & Tracy L. Dumas, The Hair Dilemma: Conform to Mainstream Expecta-
tions or Emphasize Racial Identity, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 407, 415 (2007). 
 247. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 239, at 1280, 1291-92; see also YOSHINO, supra note 
43, at 145-54 (discussing the double bind that women face, because they are pressured to 
be masculine enough to be taken seriously while also feminine enough to be an “authentic” 
woman, and nearly always failing to hit the perfect, sweet spot). 
 248. See Gowri Ramachandran, Intersectionality as “Catch 22”: Why Identity Perfor-
mance Demands are Neither Harmless nor Reasonable, 69 ALB. L. REV. 299, 301 (2006). For 
the purpose of this Article, I discuss Gulati and Carbado’s theory of “working identity,” 
Yoshino’s “covering,” and Ramachandran’s idea of “intersectionality as catch-22” together, 
because all three of these conceptualizations of the nature and costs of the performative 
aspects of identity illustrate my larger argument about how discrimination may influence 
employees’ behaviors and decisions. Ramachandran, however, carves out a somewhat more 
narrow position than the others do; she argues that expanding discrimination law to pro-
hibit all conformity demands on minorities runs the risk of essentializing groups around 
the identity performance in question. Id. at 301. She explains, “[E]quating bias against a 
typical form of identity performance for a group with bias against the group itself may 
naturalize the identity performance in question, thereby naturalizing and essentializing 
the ‘differences’ between the group and others, promoting prejudice and pigeonholing.” Id. 
at 301. She also notes that some demands are rational and “normatively good.” Id. at 307-
08. Given these concerns, she would legally condemn only those conformity demands that 
 




gay man who adopts a masculine gender identity to avoid being 
stereotyped as an effeminate gay man runs the risk of triggering the 
racist stereotype that black men are threatening and dangerous.249 
Let us say, on the other hand, he tries to avoid being perceived as one 
of the “bad blacks” by dressing to a T in designer brands, practicing 
meticulous grooming, and being especially friendly and polite with all 
of his coworkers. This strategy runs the risk of being perceived as 
weak and delicate, a “sissy.”250 There is no winning. As these writers 
also highlight, Title VII reinforces the mandate to “work” one’s 
identity, to cover, to assimilate into invisibility,251 by failing to protect 
covered employees from discrimination on the basis of the behavioral 
or cultural aspects of their identities.252 
                                                                                                                            
create a true “catch-22” for an individual, that is, demands that, because of the person’s 
intersectional identity, are impossible to meet simultaneously. Id. at 303-04. 
 Ramachandran provides the classic example of Ann Hopkins, who was denied partner-
ship at Price Waterhouse mainly because management felt she should “‘walk more femi-
ninely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, 
and wear jewelry.” See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989). The Su-
preme Court held that this type of demand constituted illegal sex discrimination because of 
the impossible position it imposed on Hopkins: “An employer who objects to aggressiveness 
in women but whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and im-
permissible catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not. 
Title VII lifts women out of this bind.” Id. at 251. Ramachandran is somewhat skeptical 
that Hopkins could not have put on a little make up, put a lid on her potty mouth, and 
ultimately made partner. Ramachandran, supra, at 317. She is hesitant to question Price 
Waterhouse’s demand that its partners be aggressive, but she ultimately seems to view 
Hopkins’ situation as a legally unjustifiable demand, or at least coming very close to one. 
Id. at 319-22 (classifying Hopkins’ predicament of having to be both aggressive and not 
aggressive as an “incoherent situation”); see also id. at 339 (noting that Hopkins’ very ex-
istence at Price Waterhouse was “something of an incongruity”). Ramachandran’s careful 
analysis provides a helpful way to think through the complexities of conformity and the 
tradeoffs of legal recognition, but the research discussed in this Article suggests that her 
narrow definition of an illegal conformity demand as only one presenting a no-win, absurd 
choice may be insufficiently sensitive to the structural dimensions of majoritarian norms 
and their impacts on individuals. 
 249. Ramachandran, supra note 248, at 322. 
 250. Id. Moreover, even if this man were straight, this strategy could backfire to a 
greater or lesser extent, as colleagues may perceive him as being an “uppity” black. Indeed, 
there is a long history in the United States of punishing blacks who acted or dressed nicely. 
In southern states, for example, African Americans were restricted to wearing dressy 
clothes only in their neighborhoods or on Sundays. Black men were even physically at-
tacked for dressing in ways that southern whites felt was above their station. After World 
War I, sometimes African-American veterans literally had their uniforms cut off them. See 
SHANE WHITE & GRAHAM WHITE, STYLIN’: AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPRESSIVE CULTURE FROM 
ITS BEGINNINGS TO THE ZOOT SUIT 155 (1998). 
 251. See Juan F. Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making of Invisible People, 70 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 965, 965-66 (1995) (describing “Latino invisibility” created by English-only rules and 
other mechanisms of erasure).  
 252. See YOSHINO, supra note 43, at 24; Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 246, at 1086-87. 
For other articles on performative aspects of identity and discrimination, see generally 
Mari J. Matsuda, Voice of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence 
for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE. L.J. 1329 (1991); Camille Gear Rich, Performing 
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E.   Bias Avoidance 
 In the work and family context, labor economist Robert Drago and 
his colleagues developed a similar idea called “bias avoidance.”253 
Bias avoidance occurs when employees respond to biases in the 
workplace by engaging in avoidance strategies—behaviors designed 
to escape potential career penalties associated with caregiving 
commitments.254 These behaviors include strategically minimizing or 
hiding family commitments.255 For example, employees may delay 
partnering, marriage, or child rearing. If already a parent, the 
employee may not take parental leave, not display family photos in 
her workspace, or not ask for a flexible work arrangement.256 
Unsurprisingly, Drago and his colleagues found that bias avoidance 
behaviors are gendered; women more often than men engage in bias 
avoidance behaviors, because the division of labor in the home is 
uneven, and ideal worker and motherhood norms are applied more 
heavily to women.257 
F.   Conclusion 
 This research illustrates how discriminatory bias and structural 
aspects of the workplace can combine in insidious ways to negatively 
impact employee energy and productivity, motivation, investments, 
aspirations, and a whole host of factors widely viewed as individual 
defects “external” to the workplace. All of this is to suggest what we 
know intuitively to be true and is not controversial across a wide 
range of fields that study social processes and organizations—that 
humans are social beings who respond to their environments—and 
when an environment is filled with prejudice, bias, and 
                                                                                                                            
Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 1134 (2004); Stephanie M. Wildman, Privilege in the Workplace: The Missing Ele-
ment in Antidiscrimination Law, 4 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 171 (1996); Kimberly A. Yuracko, 
Trait Discrimination as Race Discrimination: An Argument About Assimilation, 74 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 365 (2006). 
 253. See Robert Drago et al., The Avoidance of Bias Against Caregiving, 49 AM. BEHAV. 
SCIENTIST 1222 passim (2006). 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 1223.  
 256. Id.; see also ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES HOME 
AND HOME BECOMES WORK 85-88 (1997) (discussing her decision not to display photos of 
her children at work); WILLIAMS, supra note 115 (discussing men’s fear of using parental 
leave and the hesitation by working-class men to inform managers the real reasons for 
their absences from work (babysitting breakdowns), even in the face of discipline). 
 257. Drago et al., supra note 253, at 1223, 1240; cf. Scott A. Moss, Women Choosing 
Diverse Workplaces: A Rational Preference with Disturbing Implications for both 
Occupational Segregation and Economic Analysis of Law, 27 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 9-11 
(2004) (discussing studies finding that women’s lower level of workforce participation and 
avoidance of traditionally-male jobs is a rational response to the expectation of 
discrimination). 




discrimination, individuals’ choices, behavior, and performance can 
be negatively affected. The power of others’ beliefs over one’s 
behavior is extremely strong. 
 The good news is that the processes that give rise to inequality 
can be disrupted. In the next Part, I survey some of the experimental 
research discussing voluntary measures that employers can take to 
minimize the likelihood of bias and stereotyping and their negative 
effects, as well as several strategic and doctrinal interventions that 
would encourage employers to take affirmative steps to prevent and 
halt the domino effect. 
V.   DISRUPTING THE DOMINO EFFECT 
 Having attempted to establish the concept of the domino effect in 
the workplace, I now turn to a set of interventions that might disrupt 
this discriminatory process. I discuss two potential interventions. In 
Section V.A., I suggest voluntary measures that employers can adopt 
to prevent and remedy the processes of discrimination documented in 
this Article. These measures are evidence-based; they should be 
effective if an employer is committed to preventing and remedying 
discrimination. However, recognizing that this commitment is 
oftentimes lacking without the threat of liability, in Section V.B., I 
explore litigation strategies and revisions to some core doctrinal rules 
in Title VII jurisprudence that would allow Title VII to more 
effectively address the workplace domino effect. 
A.   Evidence-Based Voluntary Employer Measures 
  The domino effect is not inevitable. Crucial findings from the 
fields of sociology and organizational behavior provide guidance on 
voluntary measures that employers can take to disrupt the social 
processes that produce inequality inside their workplaces. In 
particular, social scientists have identified five personnel measures 
that can serve as a counterweight to the domino effect by minimizing 
the likelihood of stereotyping and its biasing effects: (1) constructing 
heterogeneous work groups; (2) creating interdependence among in-
group and out-group members; (3) minimizing the salience of 
minority status in personnel decisions; (4) replacing subjective data 
with objective data; and (5) holding decisionmakers accountable for 
nondiscrimination.258 Past research has also found positive effects of 
egalitarian organizational norms at reducing bias. Each of these 
measures is briefly explored, in turn. 
                                                                                                                            
 258. See Barbara F. Reskin, The Proximate Causes of Employment Discrimination, 29 
CONTEMP. SOC. 319, 323 (2000). 
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 Creating heterogeneous work groups with diverse membership 
tends to “suppress ingroup preference and outgroup derogation, 
stereotyping, and concomitant bias [in] personnel decisions.”259 This 
will be especially effective if work is arranged so that employees 
share “common goal[s] . . . [and] have institutional support for their 
joint enterprise.”260 Interdependence among employees incentivizes 
them to work cooperatively toward shared goals and to ascertain 
accurate, individuating information about out-group members.261 
Therefore, this type of work arrangement can diminish biases that 
may lead to discrimination. For example, supervisors who know that 
their salaries depend on the productivity or evaluations of their 
subordinates are more likely to provide the support their 
subordinates need to succeed and judge them more accurately.262 
 These measures are based on prominent social psychologist 
Gordon Allport’s “contact hypothesis,” which posits that intergroup 
contact reduces intergroup conflict and increases intergroup harmony 
under certain conditions.263 According to Allport, for intergroup 
contact to be beneficial, there must be equal status among majority 
and minority groups who share a common goal within a context of 
institutionalized support.264 Allport’s contact hypothesis has proven 
to be quite durable, despite criticisms by some social scientists as 
being naïve about the dynamics of group power. It has been validated 
in a large number of empirical studies since its proposal,265 including 
in laboratory experiments and real work settings.266 
                                                                                                                            
 259. Id. at 324. 
 260. Id. at 324. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 324-25. 
 263. See GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 264-67, 281 (1954). 
 264. See id. 
 265. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the 
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 23-24 (2000) (citing studies) (“The hypothesis has been tested, and has 
usually been confirmed, in a large number of empirical studies using many different meth-
odologies—field studies, survey research, and laboratory experiments—in a wide range of 
settings.”). 
 266. Id. at 23-26. Indeed, insights about the contact hypothesis first emerged from one 
of the largest employers in the United States, the U.S. military. As explained by 
sociologists Frank Dobbin and Alexandra Kalev: 
Evidence that contact between groups can lessen bias first came to light in an 
unplanned experiment on the European front during World War II. The U.S. 
army was still segregated, and only whites served in combat roles. High 
casualties left General Dwight Eisenhower understaffed, and he asked for 
black volunteers for combat duty. When Harvard sociologist Samuel Stouffer, 
on leave at the War Department, surveyed troops on their racial attitudes, he 
found that whites whose companies had been joined by black platoons showed 
dramatically lower racial animus and greater willingness to work alongside 
blacks than those whose companies remained segregated. Stouffer concluded 
that whites fighting alongside blacks came to see them as soldiers like 
 




 A second voluntary measure that employers can undertake to 
protect against the activation of stereotypes is to minimize the 
salience of minority status dimensions in personnel decisions. 
Salience is “[a]nything that focuses [the] observers’ attention on a 
stereotyped category” and thereby “ ‘primes’ stereotyping.”267 Thus, 
for example, “[a] highly skewed sex or race composition in a work 
group is likely to activate stereotypes.”268 This research suggests that 
a diversified workforce should diminish stereotyping by diminishing 
the salience of any particular group’s identity. 
 A third and well-established intervention that has been shown to 
minimize race and sex bias is replacing subjective data with objective 
data by developing formalized evaluation systems that rely upon ob-
jective measures. This means employers should use “objective, relia-
ble, and timely information that is directly relevant to job perfor-
mance” when making personnel decisions.269 This may be easier said 
than done, however. 
 Substantial research suggests that objective measures, alone, may 
not minimize bias in personnel decisions, because individuals do not 
consistently apply objective measures to in-group and out-group 
members.270 Two recent studies illustrate this phenomenon. In 2009, 
Joan Williams and Veta Richardson surveyed 694 law firm partners 
to get a handle on the impact of law firm compensation systems on 
women.271 “A flood of comments stressed that law firm compensation 
is subjective even when objective factors are considered.”272 Female 
partners surveyed as part of the study made comments such as, 
“some factors are ‘important’ if they justify paying a man, especially a 
                                                                                                                            
themselves first and foremost. The key, for Stouffer, was that whites and 
blacks had to be working toward a common goal as equals . . . . 
Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, Why Diversity Programs Fail: And What Works Better, 
HARV. BUS. REV., July-Aug. 2016, https://hbr.org/2016/07/why-diversity-programs-fail 
[https://perma.cc/26HY-A9VE].  
 267. Reskin, supra note 258, at 325. 
 268. Id.  
 269. Id. 
 270. See Michael I. Norton et al., Mixed Motives and Racial Bias: The Impact of Legit-
imate and Illegitimate Criteria on Decision Making, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 36, 42-44 
(2006) (finding that decisionmakers easily find reasonable, merit-based justifications for 
selecting whichever job candidate they choose); Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, 
Constructed Criteria: Redefining Merit to Justify Discrimination, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 474, 
475-76 (2005) (finding that when two job candidates were considered for the position of 
police chief, respondents preferred the male candidate when he had more experience than 
the female candidate, citing the importance of experience, but still preferred the male can-
didate when he had more education and less experience than the female candidate, citing 
the importance of education). 
 271. See generally Joan C. Williams & Veta Richardson, New Millennium, Same Glass Ceil-
ing? The Impact of Law Firm Compensation Systems on Women, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 597 (2011). 
 272. Id. at 648. 
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man with a family, . . . and other factors are ‘important’ if they will 
justify paying a woman, especially a single woman, less” and “[a]gain, 
[it] depends on who is being compensated, especially with respect to 
whom management favors. A factor that means nothing as [to] one 
partner can be the reason to compensate another partner, if someone 
on management wants to protect/cover that person.”273 In another 
study, Northwestern’s Kellogg School of Management Professor 
Laura Rivera spent a year conducting fieldwork in the recruiting de-
partment of an elite professional service firm. As part of her re-
search, she sat in on group deliberations where candidates were dis-
cussed and ultimately selected.274 She found that the team paid little 
attention when white men blew a math test, chalking up their poor 
performance to an “off day,” but paid close attention when women 
and blacks performed poorly on the same test.275 
 Given the persistence of bias and discrimination even in evalua-
tion systems employing objective measures, augmenting objective 
evaluation measures with effective accountability is crucial.276 Ac-
countability is defined as ‘‘being answerable to audiences for perform-
ing up to certain prescribed standards, thereby fulfilling obligations, 
                                                                                                                            
 273. Id. at 649-50 (first and fourth alteration in original).  
 274. LAUREN A. RIVERA, PEDIGREE: HOW ELITE STUDENTS GET ELITE JOBS 2 (2015). 
 275. Id. at 229. Courts are also not immune from this tendency. For example, in the 
Warner case, discussed supra notes 133-74, the district court honed in on the fact that the 
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it-based rating system, see Warner v. Vance-Cooks, 956 F. Supp. 2d 129, 153 (D.D.C. 2013), 
and years of experience was not a listed element in selection system, see Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment, Warner, 956 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D.D.C 2013) (No. 1:10-cv-01306), ECF No. 
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impact on creating a work environment that is free of bias. 
Declaration of William T. Bielby, Ph.D. in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certifica-
tion at ¶ 50, Dukes et al. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. C-01-2252 (N.D. Cal. 20042003), 
2003 WL 24571701. Bielby was relying in large part on Lauren Edelman and her col-
leagues’ early work on employers’ responses to civil rights laws, which found that paper 
policies oftentimes represent symbolic compliance, with little substantive impact on elimi-
nating bias. See Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organiza-
tional Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531 (1992); Lauren B. Edelman et al., 
Legal Ambiguity and the Politics of Compliance: Affirmative Action Officers’ Dilemma, 13 
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duties, expectations, and other charges.’’277 When decisionmakers 
know that they will be held accountable for the criteria they use to 
make decisions, the effect of bias on decisions is reduced and deci-
sions are made with more accuracy.278 
 Research in many contexts consistently shows the positive impact 
of accountability on reducing bias and increasing diversity. For ex-
ample, in a recent laboratory study, college-student participants 
viewed a fictional videotaped interview with an applicant for a uni-
versity department head position.279 Participants who received infor-
mation indicating that the applicant was gay rated him less positive-
ly, but the discrimination disappeared when participants were told 
that they would have to justify their ratings.280 That is, in the “ac-
countability condition,” no differences in ratings were seen between 
the gay and non-gay applicant.281 Along the same lines, studies also 
show that individuals who think their actions are being judged by 
others demonstrate lower levels of bias.282 MIT School of Manage-
ment Professor Emilio Castilla’s recent field study of performance-
based reward decisions concerning almost 9,000 employees in a large 
private company nicely illustrates this point. Castilla found that the 
firm consistently gave African Americans with identical job titles and 
performance ratings as whites, smaller raises, but when the firm 
posted each unit’s average performance rating and pay raise by race 
and gender, the gap in raises all but disappeared.283  
 The critical role of accountability in controlling bias brings us to a 
set of second questions posed by social scientists who study organiza-
tional inequality: What practices or policies create meaningful ac-
countability? Here we have some helpful research. True accountabil-
ity has three features: systemic monitoring of inequality, holding 
managers accountable for achieving equal opportunity goals, and 
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 278. See Reskin, supra note 258, at 325; Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability: The Neglected 
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 279. Joel T. Nadler et al., Aversive Discrimination in Employment Interviews: Reducing 
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 280. Id. at 485.  
 281. Id. 
 282. See Selmi, supra note 42, at 217 (reviewing studies showing that “[w]hen individ-
uals know their actions will be reviewed, they are far less likely to allow their discrimina-
tory impulses to influence their actions.”); see also Dobbin & Kalev, supra note 266, at 58-
60 (discussing several studies illustrating the principle that people “need to look good in 
the eyes of those around us.”). 
 283. See Emilio J. Castilla, Accounting for the Gap: A Firm Study Manipulating Organ-
izational Accountability and Transparency in Pay Decisions, 26 ORGANIZATIONAL SCI. 311, 
323 (2015). This study and others like it provide strong support for Gowri Ramachandran’s 
pay transparency proposal. See Ramachandran, supra note 66. 
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monitoring and analysis of employees’ perceptions of discriminatory 
barriers and career opportunities.284 Consistent with these findings, 
and based on their study of 829 mid-sized and large firms, sociolo-
gists Frank Dobbin and Alexandra Kalev identify transparency, diver-
sity taskforces, and the appointment of diversity managers as examples 
of three specific measures that successfully create accountability.285 
 In sum, the persistence of bias frustrates the potential benefits of 
incorporating objective recruitment and performance standards into 
the workplace, but it does not doom them. There is a broad consensus 
that with the added ingredient of accountability, objective evaluation 
is a very effective tool for eliminating discriminatory bias.286  
 Finally, past research has found positive effects of organizational 
norms at reducing bias in personnel decisions.287 How to change 
corporate culture is a complex subject, but research shows that 
“[e]mployers’ organizational choices can both facilitate and constrain 
the development of discriminatory work cultures.”288 
 Of course, in order for voluntary accountability measures to be 
adopted, there must be a normative commitment to equality, which 
simply does not exist in many workplaces at an organic, voluntary 
level. The next Part, therefore, explores litigation strategies and legal 
reforms that would encourage or require employers to undertake 
measures that are likely to disrupt the organizational processes that 
produce inequality. 
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his team at Johns Hopkins Hospital, for example, developed a protocol requiring that every 
physician use a checklist requiring doctors to review the need for every patient to receive 
special blood clot prevention measures upon admission to the hospital, it discovered sys-
temic gender bias. See Jessica Nordell, A Fix for Gender Bias in Healthcare? Check, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/opinion/a-fix-for-gender-bias-
in-health-care-check.html. Women trauma patients, apparently, were at significantly 
greater danger of dying of preventable blood clots than men, because doctors were less 
likely to provide them with blood clot prevention treatment. Id. After introduction of the 
checklist protocol, the gender disparity completely disappeared. Id. The intervention was 
based on surgeon, writer, and public health researcher Atul Gawande’s revolutionary book 
on the use of checklists in in the business world and medical profession. See ATUL 
GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO: HOW TO GET THINGS RIGHT (2009). Gawande’s 
research shows how something as simple as a checklist ensures that best practices are 
followed; they work by reducing errors and creating accountability in complex or stressful 
situations. Id. 
 287. Frank Dobbin, Suhann Kim & Alexandra Kalev, You Can’t Always Get What You 
Need: Organizational Determinants of Diversity Programs, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 386, 395 
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 288. See Green, Work Culture, supra note 42, at 650. 




B.   Incorporating the Domino Effect into Disparate  
Treatment Law and Practice 
 Having attempted to establish the concept of the domino effect in 
the workplace, and how it might be halted through voluntary 
measures by employers, I now turn to its implications for Title VII. I 
touch on a few concrete areas of disparate treatment law and 
practice, rather than evaluate all of the theory’s implications for 
employment discrimination law, which I will defer to future 
scholarship. I begin with suggested innovative uses of existing 
doctrine and culminate with broader reform proposals that can more 
fundamentally update disparate treatment law to incorporate the 
insights of the domino effect. 
 1.   Causation 
 The critical issue in any disparate treatment case is causation, 
that is, whether an adverse employment action was because of dis-
crimination or a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Assuming the 
claim is decided on the merits, the plaintiff’s qualifications for a posi-
tion or work performance are more often than not the central issue 
that is determinative of causation, and ultimately, the outcome of the 
claim. The emphasis holds true whether the action proceeds under 
Title VII’s burden shifting evidentiary framework for proving inten-
tional disparate treatment established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green289 or the mixed-motive alternative first established in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.290 Typically, the employer will assert that the 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment ac-
tion is that the plaintiff’s qualifications or work performance were 
weaker than another applicant or employee’s. As the Warner case 
discussed in Part III illustrates, courts often take such evidence at 
face value, dismissing disparate treatment claims on summary judg-
ment. However, the domino effect, and all of the social science re-
search establishing its existence discussed in this Article, demon-
strate that employees’ qualifications and work performance can be 
seriously diminished by discriminatory employment actions and work 
arrangements. 
 Therefore, in litigating disparate treatment claims, plaintiffs’ ad-
vocates must build a narrative explaining the domino effect and its 
ultimate impact on employees, spelling out the common chain reac-
tion that occurs when various types of discriminatory exclusion, even 
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if seemingly insignificant in isolation, combine and interact, are in-
ternalized by employees, and ultimately cause significant, material 
inequalities. The domino effect is a chronic discriminatory pattern, 
yet we have no comprehensive legal theory to prevent it, much less a 
name for it. By employing the domino effect as the theory of the case, 
advocates can help judges and juries understand how this systemic 
behavior can lead to a point at which an employee appears less quali-
fied or underperforming relative to non-protected employees.291 
 If plaintiffs’ attorneys do their job in this way, courts may be bet-
ter able to see how the discrimination alleged by the plaintiff com-
promised the plaintiff’s qualifications or work performance, and, 
more broadly, how discrimination shapes employees’ behaviors and 
preferences. Under this approach, evidence of an employee’s qualifi-
cation or work performance would still be important in deciding 
whether discrimination occurred, but it would be interpreted more 
carefully. Especially where a protected employee can show that she 
had equal or greater qualifications and experience as her peers when 
hired, and, over time, without obvious reasons, lost significant 
ground compared to unprotected employees, courts should recognize 
that a domino-like process of discrimination may be at play. Of 
course, not all responsibility for inequality of workers protected by 
Title VII can be laid at the feet of employers. At the same time, the 
substantial research establishing the domino effect suggests that this 
pattern of inequality deserves deeper judicial scrutiny. Employers 
should not be permitted to hide behind the very discrimination Title 
VII is intended to eradicate.  
 Because this approach to causation in disparate treatment actions 
is consistent with long-established summary judgment principles, it 
would not require any major doctrinal or legislative revisions. In an 
employment discrimination action, as in all civil actions, on a motion 
for summary judgment, if there is a genuine issue of material fact, 
the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party.292 Crediting plaintiffs’ assertions about their 
qualifications and job performance enough to find the plaintiff has 
created an issue of fact, and evaluating this evidence absent the 
taint of employers’ alleged discrimination, is consistent with these 
established evidentiary and procedural principles. Even in circuits 
that employ a form of evidentiary exceptionalism by adopting looser 
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summary judgment standards for employment discrimination 
claims,293 it is not inconsistent for courts to assess whether the 
alleged “nondiscriminatory reason” for an adverse employment 
action is a symptom of illegal disparate treatment.294 
 Of course, as an evidentiary matter, the assertion that a person 
would be better qualified or performed better except for the employ-
er’s discrimination may be difficult to determine. Because the domino 
effect involves dynamics that might evade direct measurement, 
courts may be hesitant to see the connection between an employer’s 
allegedly discriminatory actions and an employee’s qualifications or 
performance. Yet, the difficulty of such determinations is exactly the 
reason these questions are best left for juries. Judges must avoid the 
temptation to engage in fact finding when they are skeptical about a 
case. In turn, plaintiffs’ attorneys can help judges by educating them 
about the domino effect and by telling a compelling causal story.  
 2.   Adverse Employment Actions 
 The workplace domino effect also has significant implications for 
the definition of an adverse employment action under Title VII. Title 
VII prohibits not only discrimination in hiring and firing; it makes it 
unlawful to discriminate against an employee with respect to 
“compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” or to 
“limit, segregate, or classify . . . employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee.”295 Courts have interpreted this language 
to require that plaintiffs demonstrate an adverse employment action, 
generally defined as some material effect on the terms and conditions 
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of employment.296 Ultimate employment actions—hiring and firing—
suffice; however, when it comes to less direct economic effects on 
employees’ lives, courts have been inconsistent.297 Moreover, as the 
Warner case discussed in Section III.B. illustrates, even in cases that 
involve ultimate employment decisions, such as the denial of a 
promotion, federal courts routinely regard ongoing patterns of 
discrimination as a series of minor, isolated incidents and thereby 
place a great deal of employment discrimination beyond Title VII’s 
reach. However, as this Article demonstrates, small, seemingly 
isolated incidents of discrimination often add up to significant 
changes in an employee’s economic status. Therefore, a tangible 
adverse employment action under Title VII must be understood to 
encompass the cumulative and total effect of a series of 
discriminatory actions or circumstances that, together, result in a 
substantial change in an employee’s economic status or working 
conditions.298 
 This more expansive definition of an adverse employment action 
would align disparate treatment doctrine with sexual harassment 
doctrine, which recognizes that a series of discriminatory acts can 
rise to the level of illegal discrimination if sufficiently severe or 
pervasive.299 In determining whether an actionable hostile work 
environment claim exists, courts look to all the circumstances.300 
There is no intellectually coherent justification for distinguishing 
between disparate treatment and harassment in this regard. Like 
harassment, disparate treatment is oftentimes perpetuated through 
repeated, smaller actions, with the same cumulative harmful effects. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that sexual harassment is 
simply a variant of illegal sex discrimination; there is no requirement 
that the harassment occur because of sexual desire.301 Nor is there 
any requirement that the plaintiff have a nervous breakdown to 
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prevail in a harassment claim.302 The harassment must simply be 
unwelcome, objectively and subjectively hostile, and sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to interfere with an employee’s work 
performance.303 Given this expansive definition of unlawful 
harassment, it is hard to discern any fundamental difference between 
harassment and disparate treatment that would justify allowing 
aggregate evidence of discrimination to rise to the level of a tangible 
employment action for one claim but not the other, or for that matter, 
to disallow such aggregation for any type of disparate treatment 
claim. 
 Some may contend that a more expansive definition of an adverse 
employment action for disparate treatment claims would effectively 
transform Title VII into a general anti-bullying mandate. But Title 
VII does not prohibit all exclusionary behavior in the workplace; it is 
directed only at discrimination against protected classes of 
employees. In establishing an adverse employment action, the 
plaintiff would still be required to prove that the actions considered 
were because of or motivated by race, color, national origin, age, sex, 
or religion. 
 3.   Aggregate Disparate Treatment Claims 
 Taking this analysis a step further, if it is correct that disparate 
treatment and hostile work environment claims are not 
fundamentally different, then plaintiffs should be permitted to 
aggregate evidence of both forms of discriminatory exclusion to prove 
disparate treatment. For example, in the hypothetical discussed in 
Part II of this Article, the pharmacology professor would be 
permitted to aggregate her evidence of sexual harassment with her 
evidence of sex-based disparate treatment to prove a violation of Title 
VII.304 This reasoning should apply to race or other types of 
discrimination as well. For example, given the broad remedial 
purposes of Title VII, there is no rational reason that an African-
American plaintiff should not be permitted to aggregate evidence 
demonstrating race-based disparate treatment with evidence of a 
racially-tinged hostile work environment to support his disparate 
treatment claim. Aggregation might also be especially useful for 
employees who concurrently experience gender and sexuality based 
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discrimination, since both forms of discriminatory exclusion are 
inextricably intertwined305 and often include a component of 
harassment. 
 The possibility of aggregating sexual harassment and disparate 
treatment evidence to support a disparate treatment claim raises 
many complexities and questions.306 I will leave these for exploration 
in future work, but the larger point is that the artificial wall between 
disparate treatment and harassment obscures larger patterns of 
discriminatory conduct. It is worth considering whether this wall 
should be torn down.307  
 More broadly, the workplace domino effect can serve as a 
conceptual umbrella that invites reconsideration of a whole range of 
disparate treatment doctrines that disaggregate evidence to the point 
of incoherence, thereby obscuring the central role of employers in 
creating inequality. I call these “disaggregation doctrines.” They 
include, among others, the stray remarks doctrine,308 the “cat’s paw” 
doctrine,309 the expansive employer defense for sexual harassment,310 
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 310. See discussion supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. 




the “lack of interest” defense,311 and the rule in some circuits that 
statistical evidence is generally not probative of disparate treatment.312 
Social science research demonstrating the domino effect suggests that 
these disaggregation doctrines unduly restrict the evidence that courts 
may consider in deciding disparate treatment claims. They are ripe for 
revision (or elimination) and will be fruitful topics for future analysis 
in light of this Article’s foundational contributions.  
 Even if adopted, the litigation strategies and targeted doctrinal 
interventions explored thus far may not be sufficiently 
transformative, and so next I consider a more fundamental 
reconceptualization of Title VII’s basic proof structure.  
 4.   The Disparate Treatment Proof Structure 
 Any workplace that evidences severe patterns of discrimination, 
such as sex or racially segregated workforces or stark glass ceiling 
patterns, strongly suggests that discrimination is occurring inside 
that workplace. When these patterns are evident, Title VII should 
prohibit judges, as a matter of law, from attributing stark patterns of 
inequality to supply side factors such as individual employee 
characteristics, choices, or qualifications. 
 With this principle in mind, disparate treatment law could be 
reformed so as to create tiers of potential liability depending on the 
severity of inequality in a particular workplace. Thus, for example, 
courts or Congress could create a rebuttable presumption that an 
adverse employment action was “because of” the protected 
characteristic within the meaning of Title VII when the plaintiff 
works in a job setting that is significantly unequal. The presumption 
would not apply in workplaces demonstrating a high degree of 
integration and equality, thereby creating an incentive for employers 
to be proactive in addressing the dynamic nature of discrimination. 
Richard Ford has proposed a version of this in his concept of a 
positive “duty of care” to purge employment decisions of the influence 
of bigotry, which, if demonstrated by an employer in litigation, would 
create a safe-harbor from liability for employment discrimination.313 
Under Ford’s approach, “the law might evolve to require employers to 
use the best practices currently developed in management science to 
avoid discriminatory decisions. Doing so would give the employer a 
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safe harbor from liability; failing to do so would give rise to a strong 
presumption that challenged decisions were discriminatory.”314 I 
would go one step further. To avoid symbolic compliance,315 and to 
encourage employers to adopt effective measures, the existence of 
employer nondiscrimination policies without corresponding results 
should not suffice to eliminate the strong presumption of 
discrimination. 
 Imposing legal standards that create presumptions of 
discrimination may be a scary prospect to some readers, but the risk 
of false positives could be reduced by limiting the application of the 
presumption to situations where the workplace reflects stark 
patterns of inequality or the employer has a record of repeated past 
violations. Such an approach would also incentivize employers to 
take positive measures to ensure their workplaces are free of 
discrimination. 
 5.   Positive Duties 
 Finally, we might take a cue from countries that have demonstrated  
an earnest commitment to eliminating employment discrimination 
through implementation of proactive models to achieve worker 
equality. Such approaches involve the imposition of positive duties on 
employers “to eliminate discrimination of all types and to foster 
equality in the workplace.”316 The key feature of the positive duties 
approach is that it is not adversarial or fault-based. Rather, it 
requires employers to “formulate equality goals, to monitor their 
workplaces for inequality, and to alter practices and patterns of 
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 316. KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION 
FOR THE CHANGING WORKFORCE 192 (2004). 




conduct that stand in the way of achieving their equality goals.”317 
For example, employers would be required to conduct periodic 
reviews of employment practices, including recruitment, training, 
and promotion, for the purposes of determining whether women, 
racial minorities, and people with disabilities, for example, are 
enjoying fair participation in employment.318 
 The aim of the positive duties approach is to shift the focus away 
from individual victims and to focus instead on institution- and 
society- level practices and structures that produce inequality. Many 
countries have adopted this approach in recognition that “there 
remain deep-seated structural disadvantages which blight the lives 
of many women, Black and Asian people, and disabled persons,”319 as 
evidenced by “institutionalised racism in the police”320 and similar 
barriers in public services and private organizations. These 
observations are poignantly applicable to the situation of many 
groups in the United States.  
 Although at odds with our historical approach to regulating 
employment discrimination, the positive duties approach may 
provide a useful model for updating Title VII to reflect the domino 
effect and other contemporary forms of employment discrimination. 
At minimum, the positive duties model can inform doctrinal 
innovations that shift the responsibility for substantial workplace 
inequality to employers, where it belongs. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 Title VII has labored too long under the weight of black and white 
thinking. A significant body of sociological research on how 
discrimination operates on the ground, inside workplaces, every day 
is now available to guide courts and policymakers. This research 
demonstrates that worker inequality often results from a series of 
                                                                                                                            
 317. Id. This approach was summarized in an influential 2000 report, Equality: A New 
Framework, Report of the Independent Review of the Enforcement of UK Anti-
Discrimination Legislation. In preparing the report, the authors surveyed employers in 
Britain, Northern Ireland, and the United States and heard from many individuals and 
organizations who have either experienced the effects of discrimination or attempted to 
counter it. 
 318. STONE, supra note 316, at 71-72. Although still reliant on litigation, Margo 
Schlanger and Pauline Kim suggest something similar in their call for a greater regulatory 
role for the EEOC in the implementation of routinized and managerialist responses to em-
ployment discrimination. See Margo Schlanger & Pauline Kim, The Equal Opportunity 
Commission and Structural Reform of the American Workplace, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1519, 
1526 (2014). They argue that injunctions obtained by the EEOC in systemic cases have had 
the positive effect of encouraging employers to internalize and institutionalize norms and 
practices that facilitate equal employment opportunities. Id. at 1582. 
 319. See STONE, supra note 316, at 71-72. 
 320. Id. 
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discriminatory acts or conditions that combine and interact in ways 
that, over time, lead to large differences in employee status and pay 
due to their cumulative and mutually reinforcing nature. 
Unfortunately, the unwillingness to think rigorously about how 
discrimination occurs has had serious negative consequences. 
Stubborn patterns of discrimination exist across every industry and 
workplace setting in America. This situation will not change without 
a fundamental reconceptualization of Title VII so it may account for 
the domino effect and other contemporary forms of discriminatory 
exclusion.  
